Pietro Badoglio

1. Lead

Pietro Badoglio (28 September 1871 – 1 November 1956) was an Italian general and, from 25 July 1943 to 18 June 1944, Prime Minister of Italy, the man who took Italy out of the Axis and into the Allied camp in the Second World War. Born at Grazzano Monferrato in Piedmont, the son of a modest landowner, he entered the Royal Military Academy at Turin in 1888, served in the Italo-Turkish War and in the First World War, where he rose to the rank of lieutenant general and negotiated the armistice with Austria-Hungary at Villa Giusti in November 1918, and became, in 1925, Chief of the General Staff, a post he held until his resignation in December 1940 after the failure of the Italian invasion of Greece. He was a Marshal of Italy from 1926, the first Viceroy of Italian East Africa after the conquest of Ethiopia in 1936, and a central figure in the Fascist wars of conquest in Libya and in Ethiopia, wars in which Italian forces used poison gas and carried out massacres of civilians. With the fall of Mussolini on 25 July 1943, King Victor Emmanuel III appointed him Prime Minister of a transitional government, and it was Badoglio who, through his envoy General Giuseppe Castellano, signed the short armistice with the Allies at Cassibile in Sicily on 3 September 1943, an armistice that was announced on 8 September, and who, on 13 October 1943, declared war on Germany.

Badoglio’s career is one of the most controversial in modern Italian history, and the controversy concerns both his record as a Fascist general and his conduct as Prime Minister in 1943–1944. His defenders argue that he was a professional soldier who served his country, that he was not a Fascist ideologue, and that his decision to sign the armistice saved Italy from further destruction and allowed it to join the Allies. His critics argue that he was a willing servant of the Fascist regime, that he bore responsibility for the crimes committed in Libya and in Ethiopia, and that his handling of the armistice — the failure to inform the Italian armed forces, the flight from Rome to Brindisi on the night of 8–9 September 1943, and the abandonment of the army to the Germans — was a disgrace that cost thousands of Italian soldiers their lives. The debate over Badoglio, which began in 1943 and continues today, makes him one of the most contested figures of the Italian war, a general and a prime minister whose decisions shaped the fate of Italy and whose reputation remains divided between those who see him as a saviour and those who see him as a traitor.

2. Key Facts

Born	28 September 1871, Grazzano Monferrato, Piedmont, Kingdom of Italy (later renamed Grazzano Badoglio)
Died	1 November 1956 (aged 85), Grazzano Badoglio, Italy
Nationality	Italian
Role / Office	Marshal of Italy (from 1926); Chief of the General Staff (1925–1940); Governor of Libya (1929–1933); Viceroy of Italian East Africa (1936–1937); Prime Minister of Italy (25 July 1943 – 18 June 1944)
Known for	The armistice of Villa Giusti (1918); the conquest of Ethiopia (1935–1936); the armistice of Cassibile (3 September 1943, announced 8 September 1943); the declaration of war on Germany (13 October 1943)
Spouse / Family	Sofia Valania (married 1904, died 1942); three children, Mario, Paolo and Camillo
Military rank	Marshal of Italy (Maresciallo d’Italia)

3. Early Life and Education

Family and Childhood

Pietro Badoglio was born on 28 September 1871 at Grazzano Monferrato, a village in Piedmont, the son of Mario Badoglio, a modest landowner, and Antonietta Pittarelli, who came from a middle-class family. He was the eldest of several children, and he grew up in a household that was, by his own account, frugal and hardworking, a family that valued education and that encouraged its children to seek a career in the service of the state. He attended school at Casale Monferrato, where he was a diligent pupil, and in 1888, at the age of seventeen, he entered the Royal Military Academy at Turin, the school that trained the officers of the Italian army. He graduated in 1890 as a second lieutenant in the artillery, and he was posted to a regiment in Turin, where he learned the practical business of gunnery and of regimental life. He was a quiet and methodical officer, more notable for application than for brilliance, and his early reputation was that of a reliable and hardworking officer who could be trusted to carry out his orders thoroughly and without complaint.

Piedmont and the Italian Army

Piedmont, the region in which Badoglio was born, was the heart of the Italian army, and it shaped him in ways that remained visible throughout his career. The Piedmontese army had been the instrument of Italian unification in the nineteenth century, and its officers were trained in a tradition that valued discipline, loyalty to the King, and service to the state, a tradition that Badoglio absorbed and that he never abandoned. The Italian army of the late nineteenth century was a small and poorly equipped force, and its officers were, by European standards, underpaid and undertrained; but it was also an army that offered a career to young men of modest means, and Badoglio, who came from a family of modest landowners, took that opportunity. He learned, in the academy and in the regiment, the habits of the Italian officer: obedience, diligence, and a belief that the army was the first servant of the nation, habits that would define his whole career.

Education and First Service

Badoglio’s first service was as an artillery officer, and he served in Eritrea in 1896, in the aftermath of the Italian defeat at Adwa, where he learned the difficulties of colonial warfare. He then served in the Italo-Turkish War of 1911–1912, in Libya, where he was promoted to major and where he first encountered the problems of fighting a guerrilla war in the desert, problems that would recur in his later service in Libya. When the First World War broke out in 1915, Italy was initially neutral, and Badoglio, who was then a lieutenant colonel on the General Staff, was involved in the planning of the Italian entry into the war on the side of the Entente, which took place in May 1915. He served on the staff of the Second Army on the Isonzo front, where he took part in the battles against Austria-Hungary, and in 1917, after the disaster at Caporetto, he was appointed chief of staff of the Second Army, a post in which he helped to reorganise the army and to prepare for the final offensive of 1918. In November 1918, as a lieutenant general, he conducted the armistice negotiations with Austria-Hungary at Villa Giusti, and he signed the armistice on 3 November 1918, an act that made his name known throughout Italy.

4. Rise to Prominence

Chief of Staff and Governor of Libya

After the First World War, Badoglio rose rapidly through the ranks, and in 1925 he was appointed Chief of the General Staff, the highest post in the Italian armed forces, a post he held until 1940. In that post, he was responsible for the organisation, training and equipment of the Italian army, and he worked closely with Mussolini, who had come to power in 1922, and who regarded Badoglio as a professional soldier who could be trusted to carry out his orders. Badoglio was not a Fascist ideologue, and he did not join the Fascist Party, but he was willing to serve the regime, and he accepted the honours that it offered him, including the title of Marshal of Italy in 1926 and the title of Duke of Addis Abeba after the conquest of Ethiopia. From 1929 to 1933 he was Governor of Libya, where he was responsible for the pacification of the colony, a campaign in which Italian forces used poison gas, concentration camps and mass executions against the Libyan resistance, and in which tens of thousands of Libyans died. The campaign, which was conducted under Badoglio’s command, has been described by historians as a war crime, and Badoglio’s responsibility for it remains one of the most controversial aspects of his career.

Ethiopia and the Resignation of 1940

In 1935, Badoglio was appointed commander of the Italian forces in East Africa, and he led the invasion of Ethiopia, a campaign in which Italian forces used poison gas against Ethiopian troops and civilians, and in which the Ethiopian army was defeated and the country was annexed to the Italian Empire. Badoglio entered Addis Ababa on 5 May 1936, and he was appointed the first Viceroy of Italian East Africa, a post he held until 1937. The conquest of Ethiopia made him a national hero in Italy, and it also made him, in the eyes of the world, a war criminal, although he was never tried for the crimes committed in Ethiopia. In 1940, after Italy entered the Second World War on the side of Germany, Badoglio, as Chief of the General Staff, was responsible for the planning of the Italian invasion of Greece, an invasion that failed disastrously in the winter of 1940–1941, and that exposed the weaknesses of the Italian army. Badoglio resigned on 6 December 1940, after a quarrel with Mussolini over the conduct of the war, and he was replaced by General Ugo Cavallero. He spent the next two and a half years in retirement, at his home in Grazzano, waiting for the fall of the regime that he had served.

5. Pietro Badoglio’s Role in World War II

Prime Minister, July 1943

On 24 July 1943, after the Allied invasion of Sicily and a series of military setbacks, the Fascist Grand Council voted no confidence in Mussolini, and on 25 July King Victor Emmanuel III had Mussolini arrested and appointed Badoglio as Prime Minister of a transitional government. Badoglio, who had not been involved in the plot to depose Mussolini, was chosen by the King because he was a respected soldier, because he was not a Fascist, and because he could be trusted to negotiate an armistice with the Allies. On 26 July, the day after his appointment, Badoglio declared that the war would continue, a statement that was intended to deceive the Germans, who were Italy’s allies, while his government secretly negotiated with the Allies. The negotiations, which were conducted through General Giuseppe Castellano, began in August 1943, and they were complicated by the fact that the Allies demanded unconditional surrender, and that Badoglio, who wanted to preserve the monarchy and the army, was reluctant to accept terms that would leave Italy at the mercy of the Germans. The negotiations continued through August, and on 3 September 1943, Castellano signed the short armistice at Cassibile in Sicily, on behalf of Badoglio, who was Prime Minister.

The Short Armistice

The short armistice, signed on 3 September 1943 at Cassibile, was a brief document, consisting of twelve clauses, in which Italy agreed to cease hostilities against the Allies, to surrender its fleet, and to allow the Allies to use Italian territory. The armistice was not announced until 8 September, when General Dwight D. Eisenhower announced it on the radio, and Badoglio, who had not yet informed the Italian armed forces, made his own announcement, the Badoglio Proclamation, on the evening of 8 September. The delay between the signing and the announcement, and the failure to inform the armed forces, has been the subject of intense criticism: the Italian army, which had received no orders, was left without direction, and the Germans, who had anticipated the armistice, moved quickly to disarm the Italian forces, to occupy Rome and northern Italy, and to capture more than 600,000 Italian soldiers, many of whom were sent to Germany as forced labour. The armistice, which was intended to save Italy, thus led, in the short term, to a disaster for the Italian army, a disaster for which Badoglio has been blamed ever since.

The Armistice and the Flight to Brindisi

On the night of 8–9 September 1943, after the announcement of the armistice, Badoglio and the King fled Rome, leaving the capital without a government and the army without orders, and travelled to Brindisi, in the south of Italy, where they established a government under Allied protection. The flight has been condemned as an act of cowardice and of abandonment, and it has been defended as a necessity, on the grounds that Rome was about to be occupied by the Germans, and that the King and the Prime Minister had to escape in order to continue the war. The consequences of the flight were disastrous: the Italian army, which had received no orders, disintegrated, and the Germans, who occupied Rome on 10 September, disarmed more than 600,000 Italian soldiers, many of whom were sent to Germany, and established a puppet government under Mussolini, who had been rescued by the Germans on 12 September, in northern Italy. The armistice, which Badoglio had signed in the hope of saving Italy, thus led to a civil war in Italy, between the forces of the King and the Allies in the south, and the forces of Mussolini and the Germans in the north, a civil war that lasted until the end of the war in Europe.

The Co-Belligerent Government

On 29 September 1943, Badoglio and Eisenhower signed the long armistice on the battleship HMS Nelson off Malta, a document that set out the terms on which Italy would cooperate with the Allies, and on 13 October 1943, Badoglio and the Kingdom of Italy officially declared war on Germany. Italy was now a co-belligerent, not an ally, of the Western powers, and Badoglio’s government, which was based at Brindisi and later at Salerno, was responsible for the administration of the liberated south of Italy, and for the raising of Italian units to fight alongside the Allies. The government was weak, it was dependent on the Allies, and it was opposed by the anti-Fascist parties, which regarded Badoglio as a Fascist and demanded his removal. After the liberation of Rome on 4 June 1944, the opposition to Badoglio became irresistible, and on 18 June 1944 he resigned as Prime Minister, and was replaced by Ivanoe Bonomi, the leader of the anti-Fascist coalition. Badoglio retired to his home in Piedmont, where he remained for the rest of his life.

6. Key Decisions

Decisions in 1943

Accepting the post of Prime Minister (25 July 1943). Badoglio’s decision to accept the post of Prime Minister, knowing that he would have to negotiate an armistice with the Allies and that he would be blamed for the consequences, was the decisive choice of his career. It gave him the opportunity to take Italy out of the war, and it made him responsible for the manner in which Italy left the war, a responsibility that has been debated ever since.

Signing the short armistice (3 September 1943). His decision, through Castellano, to sign the short armistice at Cassibile was a decision to accept the Allied terms, including unconditional surrender, in the hope that the Allies would protect Italy from the Germans. The decision was based on the belief that the Allies would land in force near Rome and would protect the capital, a belief that proved to be unfounded, because the Allies landed at Salerno, far from Rome, and could not protect the city.

Fleeing Rome (8–9 September 1943). His decision to flee Rome with the King, leaving the army without orders, was the most controversial decision of his career. He later defended it as a necessity, on the grounds that Rome was about to be occupied, but his critics argue that he should have remained in Rome, or that he should at least have issued orders to the army before leaving, and that his flight was an act of abandonment.

Decisions Before and After

Using poison gas in Ethiopia (1935–1936). Badoglio’s decision, as commander in East Africa, to use poison gas against Ethiopian troops and civilians was a decision that violated the laws of war, and that has been described by historians as a war crime. He later denied that he had ordered the use of gas, but the evidence, including his own orders, shows that he did, and that he was responsible for the deaths of thousands of Ethiopians.

Declaring war on Germany (13 October 1943). His decision to declare war on Germany, after the signing of the long armistice, was a decision to take Italy into the Allied camp, and to commit Italian forces to the fight against the Germans. The decision was welcomed by the Allies, but it also meant that Italy was now at war with its former ally, and that Italian soldiers would fight and die in a war that Badoglio had helped to start.

7. Controversies

Libya and Ethiopia: War Crimes

The most serious controversy about Badoglio concerns his conduct in Libya and in Ethiopia, where Italian forces under his command used poison gas, concentration camps and mass executions. In Libya, from 1929 to 1933, Badoglio was Governor, and he was responsible for the pacification of the colony, a campaign in which the Libyan resistance, led by Omar Mukhtar, was crushed by methods that included the deportation of more than 100,000 Libyans to concentration camps in the desert, where tens of thousands died of starvation and disease. In Ethiopia, in 1935–1936, Badoglio, as commander of the Italian forces, ordered the use of poison gas against Ethiopian troops and civilians, in violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which Italy had signed, and the gas attacks, which were carried out by aircraft, killed thousands of Ethiopians. Badoglio later denied that he had ordered the use of gas, but the evidence, including his own orders and the reports of Italian officers, shows that he did, and historians have described his conduct in Libya and in Ethiopia as a war crime. He was never tried for these crimes, and the Italian government, which was eager to forget the colonial wars, did not pursue the matter; but the controversy over his responsibility remains, and it is the most serious charge against him.

The Question of Responsibility

A related controversy concerns the question of Badoglio’s responsibility for the crimes in Libya and in Ethiopia, and whether he can be held responsible for orders that were given by Mussolini and by the Fascist regime. Badoglio’s defenders argue that he was a soldier who carried out the orders of his government, and that he cannot be held responsible for the policies of the regime; his critics reply that he was not a junior officer, but the Chief of the General Staff and the commander in the field, and that he had the power to refuse, or at least to mitigate, the orders he was given. The debate is similar to the debate over other senior officers of the period, and it has no simple answer; but the evidence shows that Badoglio, who was a willing servant of the regime, did not protest against the use of gas, and did not attempt to prevent the massacres, and that he must therefore bear a share of the responsibility for them.

The Armistice of 1943

A second controversy concerns Badoglio’s handling of the armistice of 1943, and in particular his failure to inform the Italian armed forces and his flight from Rome. His defenders argue that he was in an impossible position, that the Germans were about to occupy Rome, and that he had no choice but to flee; his critics argue that he should have issued orders to the army, that he should have remained in Rome, or that he should at least have warned the commanders in the field. The controversy has been debated by historians ever since, and it has produced a large literature, in which Badoglio is portrayed, variously, as a victim of circumstances, as a coward, and as a traitor. The debate is complicated by the fact that the documents relating to the armistice were, for many years, not available to historians, and that Badoglio himself, in his memoirs, presented a self-serving account of his conduct. The consensus that is emerging is that Badoglio’s handling of the armistice was incompetent, and that his flight from Rome was a disgrace, but that the disaster that followed was also the result of German planning and of Allied failures, and that Badoglio, although he bears a large share of the responsibility, was not solely responsible for it.

8. Later Life and Death

Retirement at Grazzano

After his resignation on 18 June 1944, Badoglio retired to his home at Grazzano Monferrato, the village in which he had been born, and he spent the last twelve years of his life there, in retirement, writing his memoirs and defending his reputation. He was not tried for war crimes, although the Ethiopian government, which had been restored after the war, demanded his extradition, and the Italian government, which was eager to forget the Fascist past, refused to cooperate. He was also not tried for his conduct in 1943, although the anti-Fascist parties demanded an investigation, and the Italian government, which was divided over the question of Badoglio’s responsibility, did not pursue the matter. He lived in retirement, a controversial figure, honoured by some as the man who had taken Italy out of the war, and condemned by others as a war criminal and a traitor. His memoirs, Italy in the Second World War, published in 1948, presented his own account of his career, an account that has been criticised by historians as self-serving, but that remains an important source for the history of Italy in the Second World War.

Death and Burial

Badoglio died at Grazzano Badoglio — the village had been renamed in his honour after the conquest of Ethiopia — on 1 November 1956, aged eighty-five. He was buried in the family tomb at Grazzano, and his funeral was attended by a small number of relatives and friends, a quiet end to a career that had begun with the promise of a great soldier and ended in controversy. His death was noted in the Italian press, but it did not cause the public debate that his life had caused, and it was not until many years later, with the opening of the archives and the publication of new histories of the Italian war, that his reputation was re-examined. He left behind a reputation that remains divided: to his admirers, a professional soldier who served his country and who took Italy out of a disastrous war; to his critics, a war criminal and a traitor who betrayed his army and his country in 1943.

9. Legacy of Pietro Badoglio

The Armistice and the Italian Co-Belligerency

Badoglio’s lasting legacy is the armistice of 1943 and the co-belligerency that followed it, which allowed Italy to join the Allies and to fight alongside them in the last year of the war. The Italian Co-Belligerent Army, which was formed under Badoglio’s government, fought alongside the Allies in the campaign in Italy, and Italian partisans, who fought in the north, played an important part in the liberation of Italy. The armistice, although it was handled badly, was a turning point in the war in Italy: it took Italy out of the Axis, it opened the south of Italy to the Allies, and it allowed the Allies to use Italy as a base for the invasion of southern France and for the bombing of Germany. Badoglio’s name is associated with the armistice, and he is remembered in Italy as the man who signed it, a reputation that has survived the controversies over his conduct.

A Reputation Re-examined

In recent decades, Badoglio’s reputation has been re-examined, and the heroic image that was created by his memoirs has been qualified. Historians now stress that his record in Libya and in Ethiopia was criminal, that his handling of the armistice was incompetent, and that his flight from Rome was a disgrace; they also stress that his decision to sign the armistice was, in the circumstances, the right decision, and that it saved Italy from further destruction. The re-examination has not erased his achievement in taking Italy out of the war, but it has placed it in its proper context. Badoglio is now remembered as a flawed figure — a professional soldier who served a criminal regime, who committed crimes in its service, and who, at the end, took the decision that saved his country from the consequences of the war he had helped to start. The re-examination has also drawn on the archives of the Italian army, which were opened in the 1990s, and on the memoirs of his contemporaries, which present a more critical picture of Badoglio than the one he presented in his own memoirs.

10. Assessment by Historians

The Military Assessment

Military historians assess Badoglio as a competent staff officer and a mediocre commander, and the assessment rests on the distinction between the two roles. As Chief of the General Staff, he was diligent and organised, and he was trusted by Mussolini to carry out the administrative business of the army. As a commander in the field, in Libya and in Ethiopia, he was successful, but his success was achieved by methods — poison gas, concentration camps, mass executions — that violated the laws of war, and that have been condemned by historians. As Prime Minister in 1943, he was out of his depth, and his handling of the armistice was incompetent, a failure that cost thousands of Italian soldiers their lives. Historians argue that Badoglio’s career shows the limits of the professional soldier: he was a man who could organise an army, but who could not make the political decisions that a prime minister must make, and who, when faced with a political crisis, failed.

The Moral Assessment

The moral assessment of Badoglio is harsh, and it has become harsher over time. He was a senior officer who served a criminal regime, who ordered the use of poison gas against civilians, who was responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of Libyans and Ethiopians, and who, as Prime Minister, abandoned his army to the Germans. His defenders argue that he was a professional soldier who did his duty, and that his decision to sign the armistice saved Italy; his critics reply that a professional soldier who commits war crimes is a war criminal, and that a prime minister who abandons his army is a traitor. The consensus among historians is that Badoglio was guilty of war crimes in Libya and in Ethiopia, and that his conduct in 1943 was a disgrace, but that his decision to sign the armistice was, in the circumstances, the right decision, and that it should be remembered alongside his crimes. He is remembered as a flawed figure, a man whose professional gifts were placed, without serious protest, at the service of a criminal regime, and whose reputation must therefore be judged with both admiration for his decision in 1943 and condemnation of the crimes he committed in its service.

Frequently Asked Questions

Who was Pietro Badoglio?
Pietro Badoglio (1871–1956) was an Italian general and Prime Minister of Italy from 25 July 1943 to 18 June 1944. He signed the armistice with the Allies at Cassibile on 3 September 1943, announced on 8 September, and declared war on Germany on 13 October 1943.

When did Italy sign the armistice with the Allies?
The short armistice was signed at Cassibile in Sicily on 3 September 1943 by General Giuseppe Castellano, on behalf of Badoglio, and it was announced by General Eisenhower and by Badoglio on 8 September 1943. The long armistice was signed by Badoglio and Eisenhower on 29 September 1943, on HMS Nelson off Malta.

Why did Badoglio flee Rome in September 1943?
On the night of 8–9 September 1943, after the announcement of the armistice, Badoglio and King Victor Emmanuel III fled Rome for Brindisi, in the south of Italy, where they established a government under Allied protection. Badoglio later defended the flight as a necessity, because Rome was about to be occupied by the Germans; his critics have condemned it as an abandonment of the army, which was left without orders and was disarmed by the Germans.

What was Badoglio’s role in Ethiopia?
In 1935–1936 Badoglio commanded the Italian forces in the invasion of Ethiopia, in which Italian forces used poison gas against Ethiopian troops and civilians. He entered Addis Ababa on 5 May 1936 and became the first Viceroy of Italian East Africa. Historians have described the use of poison gas as a war crime, and Badoglio’s responsibility for it remains one of the most serious charges against him.

How long was Badoglio Prime Minister?
Badoglio was Prime Minister from 25 July 1943 to 18 June 1944, a period of almost eleven months. He resigned after the liberation of Rome on 4 June 1944, and was replaced by Ivanoe Bonomi.

Was Badoglio tried for war crimes?
No. Badoglio was never tried for the crimes committed in Libya and in Ethiopia, although the Ethiopian government demanded his extradition after the war. He was also not tried for his conduct in 1943. He died at Grazzano Badoglio on 1 November 1956, aged 85.

Sources

1. Wikipedia, “Pietro Badoglio” — consolidated biography: birth 28 September 1871, death 1 November 1956, Prime Minister 25 July 1943 – 18 June 1944, armistice 3 September 1943, announced 8 September, declaration of war on Germany 13 October 1943.
2. Pietro Badoglio, Italy in the Second World War: Memories and Documents (1948) — memoirs; the fall of Mussolini, the armistice, the flight to Brindisi.
3. Elena Aga Rossi, A Nation Collapses: The Italian Surrender of September 1943 (2000) — the armistice, the failure to inform the armed forces, the flight from Rome.
4. Angelo Del Boca, The Ethiopian War 1935–1941 (1969) — the use of poison gas in Ethiopia and Badoglio’s responsibility for it.
5. MacGregor Knox, Mussolini Unleashed 1939–1941 (1982) — Badoglio as Chief of the General Staff, the invasion of Greece, the resignation of December 1940.
6. History of War, “Pietro Badoglio, 1871–1956” — Chief of Staff 1925–1940, Governor of Libya, the armistice and the declaration of war on Germany.