Battle of Makin

1. Lead

The Battle of Makin was fought from 20 to 24 November 1943, on Makin Atoll in the Gilbert Islands in the central Pacific, and it was part of the American operation to capture the Gilberts, codenamed Operation Galvanic. While the US Marines were fighting the bloody battle for Tarawa, about 160 kilometres to the south, the US Army’s 27th Infantry Division landed on Makin, then known as Butaritari Island, to capture the atoll from its Japanese garrison. The battle for Makin was very different from Tarawa: the landing was less heavily opposed, the fighting was slower, and the American troops advanced methodically across the narrow island, using tanks, artillery, and air support to overcome Japanese strongpoints. The Japanese garrison, numbering about 800 men, fought stubbornly from bunkers and trenches, but it was outnumbered and outgunned, and by 24 November the island was declared secure. American losses were about 66 killed and about 200 wounded, a figure that was much lower than at Tarawa, but the battle was criticised afterwards for the slow pace of the advance and for the performance of the 27th Division, whose commander was later relieved. The capture of Makin, together with Tarawa, gave the United States airfields in the Gilberts from which it could bomb the Marshall Islands and prepare for the next stage of the advance towards Japan.

2. Key Facts

Field	Value
Date	20–24 November 1943
Location	Makin Atoll (Butaritari Island), Gilbert Islands, central Pacific
Result	US victory; atoll captured; airfield secured
US commander	Major General Ralph C. Smith (27th Infantry Division); Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner (naval force)
Japanese commander	Lieutenant Junior Grade Seizo Ishikawa (garrison commander)
US strength	About 6,400 men of the 27th Infantry Division, with naval and air support
Japanese strength	About 800 men, including naval infantry and labour troops
US losses	About 66 killed, about 200 wounded
Japanese losses	About 800 killed or captured (almost the entire garrison)
Notable feature	Fought alongside the Battle of Tarawa as part of Operation Galvanic

3. Background

Operation Galvanic and the Gilbert Islands

Operation Galvanic was the American plan to capture the Gilbert Islands in November 1943, as the first step in the advance across the central Pacific towards Japan. The Gilberts, which included Tarawa and Makin, were important because they were within range of the Marshall Islands, the next objective, and because they provided airfields from which American bombers could support the advance. The operation was commanded by Admiral Chester Nimitz, who was the commander-in-chief of the Pacific Fleet, and by Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, who commanded the amphibious force. The plan called for the 2nd Marine Division to land on Tarawa, the main objective, and for the 27th Infantry Division to land on Makin, a secondary objective that was expected to be easier to capture. The two landings were to take place on the same day, 20 November 1943, and they were to be supported by naval gunfire, carrier aircraft, and battleships. The operation was the first American amphibious assault in the central Pacific, and it was a test of the new doctrine of island warfare that the United States would use for the rest of the war.

Why Makin Was Chosen

Makin was chosen as an objective because it had an airfield that the Japanese had built on Butaritari Island, and because its capture would give the Americans a second airfield in the Gilberts, in addition to the airfield on Tarawa. The airfield at Makin, though small, could be used by American fighters and bombers to support the advance on the Marshalls, and its capture would deny the Japanese a base from which they could attack the American fleet. Makin was also thought to be lightly defended, with a garrison of only a few hundred men, and the American planners expected it to fall quickly, with few casualties. The island itself was a narrow atoll, about 15 kilometres long and only a few hundred metres wide in places, with a lagoon on one side and the open sea on the other. The narrow shape of the island meant that the American troops, once they had landed, could advance from one end to the other, clearing the island as they went, but it also meant that the Japanese defenders could build strongpoints across the width of the island and force the Americans to attack them head-on.

The Japanese Garrison

The Japanese garrison on Makin was small, numbering about 800 men, and it was commanded by Lieutenant Junior Grade Seizo Ishikawa, a naval officer who had been sent to the island to build and defend the airfield. The garrison included about 300 naval infantry, who were trained soldiers, and about 500 labour troops, who were Korean and Japanese workers who had been brought to the island to build the airfield and who were given rifles and ordered to fight. The garrison had no tanks, few heavy weapons, and no air support, and it was isolated from the rest of the Japanese forces in the Pacific, with no hope of reinforcement. The Japanese had built a series of bunkers, trenches, and pillboxes across the island, using coral, logs, and concrete, and they had placed anti-tank guns and machine guns to cover the approaches from the lagoon. The garrison was ordered to fight to the death, and most of its men did so, holding their positions until they were killed or captured. The small size of the garrison, and its lack of heavy weapons, meant that the Americans had a great advantage in numbers and in firepower, but the Japanese still fought stubbornly for four days.

4. Opposing Forces

The US 27th Infantry Division

The US 27th Infantry Division, which landed on Makin, was a National Guard division from New York, commanded by Major General Ralph C. Smith, and it had been training in Hawaii for the invasion of the Gilberts. The division was made up of three infantry regiments, the 105th, 106th, and 165th, of which the 165th, a regiment with a long history dating back to the Civil War, was chosen to make the landing on Makin. The 165th was supported by tanks, artillery, engineers, and by naval gunfire from the battleships and cruisers that accompanied the landing force. The division had not yet fought in combat, and many of its men were new to battle, but they were well trained and well equipped, and they had the advantage of overwhelming firepower. The landing force numbered about 6,400 men, which was eight times the size of the Japanese garrison, and it was supported by carrier aircraft that bombed the island before and during the landing. The 27th Division’s performance at Makin, however, was criticised afterwards for being slow and cautious, and Smith was later relieved of command after the battle for Saipan in 1944.

Tanks, Artillery, and Naval Support

The American force at Makin was supported by tanks, artillery, and naval gunfire, which gave it a great advantage over the Japanese garrison. The tanks, which were M3 Stuart light tanks, were landed on the island and used to support the infantry as they advanced, firing on Japanese bunkers and strongpoints. The artillery, which included 105mm howitzers, was landed after the infantry and used to shell the Japanese positions from a distance. The naval force, which included the battleship Mississippi and several cruisers and destroyers, bombarded the island before the landing and provided fire support during the battle. The carrier aircraft, which flew from the escort carriers that accompanied the force, bombed and strafed the Japanese positions and provided close air support for the infantry. The combination of tanks, artillery, naval gunfire, and air support meant that the Americans could destroy Japanese strongpoints without having to attack them with infantry alone, and it was one of the reasons why American casualties at Makin were relatively low.

The Japanese Defenders

The Japanese defenders on Makin were a small and isolated force, but they fought with determination and with skill, using the terrain and their prepared positions to slow the American advance. The naval infantry, who were the core of the garrison, were trained soldiers who had fought in China and who were experienced in defence, while the labour troops, though less well trained, fought bravely when they were ordered to do so. The Japanese had built their defences across the width of the island, with bunkers and trenches that were difficult to see and difficult to attack, and they had placed their machine guns to cover the approaches from the lagoon. The Japanese also used snipers, who hid in the palm trees and fired on American troops as they advanced, and they launched a night counter-attack on the first night, which was repulsed with heavy losses. The Japanese garrison, though outnumbered and outgunned, held out for four days, and it was only destroyed when the Americans used tanks and artillery to systematically reduce each strongpoint.

5. The Battle

The Landing: 20 November 1943

The landing on Makin began at dawn on 20 November 1943, when American troops of the 165th Infantry Regiment landed on the lagoon side of Butaritari Island, supported by naval gunfire and carrier aircraft. The landing was opposed by Japanese machine-gun and rifle fire, but the resistance was lighter than at Tarawa, and the Americans were able to get ashore with relatively few casualties. The first troops landed on Red Beach, on the western end of the island, and they advanced inland, capturing the Japanese positions near the beach and then moving eastwards along the island. The landing was complicated by the reef, which prevented the landing craft from reaching the beach at low tide, and by the narrowness of the island, which meant that the troops had to advance in a single column. By the end of the first day, the Americans had established a beachhead and had advanced about two kilometres inland, but they had not yet captured the airfield, which was the main objective, and the Japanese were still holding strong positions further east.

The First Night and the Japanese Counter-Attack

On the first night, the Japanese launched a counter-attack against the American beachhead, in an attempt to drive the Americans back into the sea. The attack was carried out by about 200 Japanese troops, who advanced through the darkness and attacked the American positions with rifles, grenades, and bayonets. The attack was repulsed by American infantry, supported by artillery and by machine guns, and the Japanese suffered heavy losses, with many of their men killed in the fighting. The counter-attack was the only major Japanese attack of the battle, and its failure meant that the Japanese would have to fight a defensive battle for the rest of the operation, holding their bunkers and trenches as the Americans advanced slowly eastwards. The first night also showed the Americans that the Japanese would fight to the death, and that the battle would not be over quickly, even though the garrison was small.

The Advance Across the Island: 21–24 November

The advance across the island continued from 21 to 24 November, as the American troops moved eastwards, clearing the island one strongpoint at a time. The advance was slow, because the Japanese had built bunkers across the width of the island, and each bunker had to be attacked with tanks, artillery, and infantry, a process that took time and that exposed the Americans to sniper fire and to machine-gun fire. The Americans used their tanks to fire on the bunkers at close range, and their engineers used demolitions to destroy the bunkers that could not be taken by direct assault. The airfield, which was the main objective, was captured on 22 November, and the Americans then continued eastwards, clearing the rest of the island. By 24 November, the island was declared secure, though isolated Japanese soldiers continued to hide in the palm trees and to snipe at American troops for several more days. The battle had lasted four days, and it had cost the Americans 66 killed and about 200 wounded, a figure that was much lower than at Tarawa, where the Marines had lost more than 1,000 killed in three days.

6. Turning Point

The Capture of the Airfield

The turning point of the Battle of Makin came on 22 November, when the Americans captured the airfield on Butaritari Island, because the airfield was the main objective of the operation and its capture meant that the battle was effectively won. The airfield had been built by the Japanese on the western end of the island, and it was defended by bunkers and trenches that the Americans had to clear before they could use it. Once the airfield was captured, the Americans could bring in their own aircraft, and the Japanese, who had lost their main defensive position, were forced to retreat eastwards, where they were gradually destroyed. The capture of the airfield also meant that the Americans had achieved their strategic aim, which was to secure an airfield in the Gilberts from which they could support the advance on the Marshalls. The battle continued for two more days, but after the airfield fell, the outcome was no longer in doubt, and the remaining Japanese troops were isolated and outnumbered.

The Slow Pace of the Advance

The slow pace of the American advance at Makin became a turning point in a different sense, because it led to criticism of the 27th Division and of its commander, General Smith, and it raised questions about the performance of Army troops in amphibious operations. The Marines, who had fought at Tarawa, had advanced quickly and aggressively, even at heavy cost, while the Army troops at Makin had advanced slowly and cautiously, using artillery and tanks to reduce each strongpoint before moving forward. The difference in pace was partly due to the different situations — Tarawa was a small island where the Marines had to attack quickly, while Makin was a long island where the Army could advance methodically — but it was also due to the different doctrines of the two services. The criticism of the 27th Division at Makin would later contribute to Smith’s relief after Saipan, and it became part of the long-running rivalry between the Army and the Marine Corps in the Pacific war.

The Failure of the Japanese Counter-Attack

The failure of the Japanese counter-attack on the first night was also a turning point, because it meant that the Japanese had spent their only reserve and that they would have to fight a defensive battle for the rest of the operation. The counter-attack, which was launched by about 200 men, was repulsed with heavy losses, and the Japanese who survived it retreated to their bunkers and trenches, where they were gradually destroyed by American tanks and artillery. The failure of the counter-attack showed that the Japanese, though brave, were outnumbered and outgunned, and that they could not hope to drive the Americans back into the sea. The battle, therefore, became a slow and methodical advance by the Americans, and the Japanese could only delay the inevitable, not prevent it. The turning point at Makin was not a dramatic moment, but a slow realisation that the island would fall, and that the only question was how long it would take and how many lives it would cost.

7. Casualties and Losses

US Losses

American losses at Makin were about 66 killed and about 200 wounded, a figure that was much lower than at Tarawa, where the Marines had lost more than 1,000 killed, and it reflected the different nature of the two battles. The low American losses at Makin were due to the overwhelming firepower that the Americans brought to bear, to the small size of the Japanese garrison, and to the cautious tactics of the 27th Division, which used tanks and artillery to reduce Japanese strongpoints before attacking them with infantry. The losses, however, were still significant for the families of the men who died, and they included soldiers from the 165th Infantry Regiment, a regiment with a long and proud history. The American dead at Makin are buried in the United States, and their names are recorded in the records of the 27th Division. The low casualty figure at Makin has sometimes been used to argue that the battle was easy, but the men who fought there faced sniper fire, machine-gun fire, and the danger of Japanese bunkers, and their courage should not be underestimated.

The Criticism of the 27th Division

The criticism of the 27th Division after Makin focused on the slow pace of the advance and on the number of men who were used to capture an island defended by only 800 Japanese. The Marines, who had taken Tarawa in three days at heavy cost, argued that the Army had been too cautious and that it had taken too long to capture Makin, while the Army argued that its methodical approach had saved lives and that it had achieved its objective with few casualties. The debate became part of the wider rivalry between the Army and the Marine Corps, and it was revived after the battle for Saipan in 1944, when General Smith was relieved of command by Marine General Holland Smith. The criticism of the 27th Division at Makin, therefore, had consequences that lasted beyond the battle itself, and it influenced the way that Army and Marine operations were organised for the rest of the war.

Japanese Losses

Japanese losses at Makin were almost total, with about 800 men killed or captured, out of a garrison of about 800, and only a handful of prisoners were taken. The Japanese garrison fought to the death, as it had been ordered to do, and most of its men were killed in their bunkers and trenches, or in the counter-attack on the first night. The few Japanese who survived were taken prisoner, and they provided valuable intelligence about Japanese defences in the Gilberts and the Marshalls. The total loss of the garrison was typical of Japanese island defences in the Pacific war, where garrisons were ordered to fight to the last man and where few prisoners were taken. The Japanese losses at Makin, though small in absolute terms, were significant because they removed a Japanese airfield from the Gilberts and because they showed that the Japanese could not hold an isolated island against an American amphibious assault.

8. Map and Geography

Makin Atoll and Butaritari Island

Makin Atoll is a coral atoll in the Gilbert Islands, in the central Pacific, about 160 kilometres north of Tarawa, and its main island, Butaritari, is a narrow strip of land about 15 kilometres long and only a few hundred metres wide in places. The island is surrounded by a lagoon on one side and by the open sea on the other, and it is covered in palm trees, with a small airfield on its western end. The narrow shape of the island meant that the American troops, once they had landed, could advance from one end to the other, clearing the island as they went, but it also meant that the Japanese could build defences across the width of the island and force the Americans to attack them head-on. The lagoon, which was shallow and crossed by a reef, made the landing difficult, because the landing craft could not reach the beach at low tide, and the Americans had to wade ashore through the water. The geography of Makin, therefore, shaped the battle, making it a slow and methodical advance across a narrow island, rather than a rapid assault on a compact objective like Tarawa.

The Lagoon, the Reef, and the Airfield

The lagoon, the reef, and the airfield were the three key features of the geography of Makin, and each of them played a role in the battle. The lagoon, on the western side of the island, was the landing area, and it was shallow and crossed by a coral reef that prevented the landing craft from reaching the beach. The Americans had to transfer to smaller boats and to wade ashore, a process that was slow and that exposed them to Japanese fire. The reef itself was a barrier that the Japanese had hoped would prevent a landing, but the Americans were able to cross it, though with difficulty. The airfield, on the western end of the island, was the main objective, and it was built on a flat area of coral that had been cleared of palm trees. The airfield was defended by bunkers and trenches, and its capture was the turning point of the battle. The geography of Makin, with its lagoon, its reef, and its airfield, was typical of the atolls of the central Pacific, and the lessons learned there were applied in the later invasions of the Marshalls and the Marianas.

The Gilbert Islands and the Central Pacific

The Gilbert Islands, of which Makin is a part, are a chain of atolls in the central Pacific, about 2,000 kilometres south-west of Hawaii, and they were the first objective in the American advance across the central Pacific. The Gilberts were important because they were within range of the Marshall Islands, the next objective, and because they provided airfields from which American bombers could support the advance. The capture of the Gilberts, at Tarawa and Makin, was therefore a strategic step, not just a tactical one, and it opened the way for the invasion of the Marshalls in January 1944. The geography of the central Pacific, with its scattered atolls and its vast distances, made the war there a war of amphibious assaults and of carrier battles, in which the side that could project power across the ocean would win. The battle for Makin, though small, was part of that larger war, and its outcome contributed to the American advance towards Japan.

9. Outcome and Legacy

The Capture of the Gilberts

The outcome of the Battle of Makin was an American victory, and, together with the victory at Tarawa, it secured the Gilbert Islands for the United States. The capture of the Gilberts gave the Americans airfields from which they could bomb the Marshall Islands, and it provided a base for the next stage of the advance, the invasion of Kwajalein and Eniwetok in January and February 1944. The victory at Makin also showed that the American amphibious doctrine, which had been developed in the interwar years and tested at Guadalcanal and Tarawa, could work, even if the performance of the 27th Division was criticised. The battle was a step on the road to Japan, and its outcome, though less dramatic than Tarawa, was an important part of the American advance across the Pacific. The Gilberts remained in American hands for the rest of the war, and they were used as bases for the bombing of the Marshalls and for the training of troops for later invasions.

Lessons for Later Landings

The legacy of Makin includes the lessons that were learned for later amphibious landings in the Pacific, notably the need for better intelligence about reefs and tides, the need for more effective naval gunfire support, and the need for closer coordination between the Army and the Marine Corps. The landing at Makin, like the landing at Tarawa, was complicated by the reef, which prevented landing craft from reaching the beach, and the Americans learned that they needed to use amphibious tractors, known as LVTs, to cross the reef. The slow pace of the advance at Makin also led to a debate about tactics, with some arguing for a more aggressive approach and others arguing for a methodical approach that saved lives. The lessons of Makin were applied in the later invasions of the Marshalls, the Marianas, and Okinawa, where American troops used tanks, artillery, and air support to reduce Japanese strongpoints systematically. The battle, therefore, though small, contributed to the development of American amphibious doctrine.

Memory and Commemoration

Makin is remembered today as part of Operation Galvanic, and as the companion battle to Tarawa, though it is less well known than Tarawa because it was less costly and less dramatic. The battle is commemorated in the United States by the 27th Infantry Division Association, and by the families of the men who fought there, and it is studied by military historians as an example of Army amphibious operations in the Pacific. The island of Butaritari, which is now part of the Republic of Kiribati, is visited by few tourists, but its airfield, which was built by the Japanese and used by the Americans, is still there, and the remains of Japanese bunkers and American landing craft can still be seen. The battle for Makin is a reminder that not all battles in the Pacific were as famous as Tarawa or Iwo Jima, but that each of them contributed to the American victory and cost lives that should not be forgotten. Visitors still walk the battlefield today, reading the names on the memorials, studying the ground where the fighting took place, and remembering the soldiers from many nations who fought and died together.

10. Commanders

Major General Ralph C. Smith

Major General Ralph C. Smith commanded the 27th Infantry Division at Makin, and he was an experienced Army officer who had served in the First World War and who had trained his division in Hawaii for the invasion of the Gilberts. Smith was a careful and methodical commander, and his approach at Makin was to advance slowly, using artillery and tanks to reduce Japanese strongpoints before attacking them with infantry. His approach saved American lives, but it was criticised by the Marines, who thought it was too slow, and the criticism would later contribute to his relief after the battle for Saipan in 1944, when Marine General Holland Smith relieved him of command. Ralph Smith’s career was damaged by the controversy, but his conduct at Makin was defensible, and his division did capture the island with relatively few casualties. His story is a reminder of the difficulties of coalition warfare and of the rivalry between the Army and the Marine Corps in the Pacific.

Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner

Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner commanded the amphibious force at Makin and Tarawa, and he was one of the most important American naval commanders in the Pacific war. Turner was responsible for planning and executing the landings in the Gilberts, and he was known for his aggressive and demanding style, which earned him the nickname “Terrible Turner”. Turner’s planning for Operation Galvanic was thorough, but the landings were complicated by the reefs and by the lack of intelligence about the Japanese defences, and the heavy losses at Tarawa led to criticism of his planning. At Makin, Turner’s force provided naval gunfire and air support for the landing, and his ships remained off the island to support the troops as they advanced. Turner went on to command the amphibious forces at Saipan, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, and he became one of the most experienced amphibious commanders of the war. His role at Makin was part of a long career in which he helped to develop the doctrine of amphibious warfare.

Lieutenant Seizo Ishikawa

Lieutenant Junior Grade Seizo Ishikawa commanded the Japanese garrison on Makin, and he was a naval officer who had been sent to the island to build and defend the airfield. Ishikawa was a young officer with little combat experience, but he organised the defence of the island with skill, building bunkers and trenches across its width and ordering his men to fight to the death. Ishikawa was killed in the fighting, along with almost all of his garrison, and his conduct has been praised by historians for its courage, even though the battle was lost from the start. The Japanese garrison at Makin, though small, fought for four days against overwhelming odds, and its resistance showed the determination of Japanese troops in the Pacific war. Ishikawa’s name is not well known, but his defence of Makin is an example of the Japanese doctrine of fighting to the last man, which would be repeated on many other islands in the Pacific.

Frequently Asked Questions

When was the Battle of Makin fought?
The battle was fought from 20 to 24 November 1943, on Makin Atoll in the Gilbert Islands.

Was Makin part of the same operation as Tarawa?
Yes. Both landings were part of Operation Galvanic, the American invasion of the Gilbert Islands. Tarawa was the main objective and Makin was a secondary objective.

How many Americans were killed at Makin?
About 66 Americans were killed and about 200 wounded, far fewer than at Tarawa, where more than 1,000 Marines were killed.

Why was the 27th Division criticised after Makin?
The division was criticised for advancing slowly and cautiously, taking four days to capture an island defended by only about 800 Japanese, though its methodical approach kept casualties low.

What happened to the Japanese garrison?
Almost the entire garrison of about 800 men was killed or captured, with only a handful of prisoners taken, in line with the Japanese doctrine of fighting to the death.

Why was Makin important?
Its airfield gave the Americans a base in the Gilberts from which to support the advance on the Marshall Islands, the next step towards Japan.

Sources

• The US Naval History and Heritage Command, Gilberts collection
• Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. VII (1951)
• The 27th Infantry Division Association, Makin history
• The National WWII Museum, Tarawa and Makin resources
• Joseph H. Alexander, Utmost Savagery: The Three Days of Tarawa (1995)
• The Imperial War Museum, Pacific War collection