Battle of the Philippine Sea

The Battle of the Philippine Sea was fought on 19–20 June 1944, west of the Mariana Islands in the western Pacific, and it was the largest carrier battle of the Second World War. The United States Fifth Fleet, under Admiral Raymond Spruance, was covering the American landings on Saipan when the Japanese Combined Fleet, under Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, sailed to attack it, hoping to destroy the American carriers and to save the Marianas.

The battle was fought entirely by aircraft, with the two fleets never coming within gun range of each other, and it ended in a decisive American victory. American pilots, flying from fifteen carriers, shot down about 600 Japanese aircraft on 19 June, a day that American airmen called the “Great Marianas Turkey Shoot”, and American submarines and aircraft sank three Japanese carriers, including the flagship Taiho and the Shokaku.

Japanese losses were so heavy that the Imperial Japanese Navy never recovered its carrier air power, and the battle marked the end of Japan’s ability to challenge the United States at sea. The American victory also secured the Marianas, from which American bombers would later fly to Japan itself, and it opened the way for the liberation of the Philippines and the final advance towards Japan.

1. Key Facts

Field	Value
Date	19–20 June 1944
Location	Philippine Sea, west of the Mariana Islands
Result	Decisive US victory; Japanese carrier air power destroyed
US commander	Admiral Raymond Spruance (Fifth Fleet); Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher (Task Force 58)
Japanese commander	Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa (Mobile Fleet)
US strength	15 carriers, about 900 aircraft, 7 battleships, escorts
Japanese strength	9 carriers, about 430 aircraft, 5 battleships, escorts
US losses	About 130 aircraft; 1 battleship damaged; about 150 men killed
Japanese losses	3 carriers sunk, about 600 aircraft lost, about 2,000–3,000 men killed
Notable feature	“Great Marianas Turkey Shoot” — about 600 Japanese aircraft shot down on 19 June

2. Background

The Marianas and the Advance Towards Japan

By the summer of 1944 the United States had won a series of victories in the Pacific, from Midway in 1942 to the landings in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands in 1943, and it was now preparing to invade the Mariana Islands, a chain of islands about 2,000 kilometres south of Japan.

The Marianas were important because they were within range of Japan for the new American B-29 bombers, which could fly from Saipan, Tinian, and Guam to bomb the Japanese home islands. The invasion of Saipan, which began on 15 June 1944, was therefore a key step in the American advance towards Japan, and the Japanese understood its importance.

The Japanese high command decided to commit the Combined Fleet to a decisive battle, hoping to destroy the American carriers and to save the Marianas, just as they had hoped to do at Midway two years earlier. The Japanese plan, codenamed Operation A-Go, called for the Mobile Fleet under Ozawa to sail from the Philippines, to attack the American carriers west of the Marianas, and to use land-based aircraft from Guam and Rota to support the attack.

The Japanese Plan: Operation A-Go

Operation A-Go was based on the Japanese belief that their carrier aircraft, flying from a greater range than the American aircraft, could attack the American carriers before the Americans could attack them. The Japanese carriers were equipped with new aircraft, notably the A6M Zero fighter and the D4Y Judy dive bomber, and they were supported by land-based aircraft from the Marianas and the Philippines.

The Japanese plan also relied on the use of the “out-and-back” tactic, in which Japanese aircraft would fly to Guam, refuel and rearm, and then fly on to attack the American carriers, while American aircraft, which had a shorter range, would have to return to their carriers.

The plan was ambitious, but it was based on an overestimate of Japanese air power and an underestimate of American air power, and it failed because the Japanese pilots were inexperienced and because the American carriers had better aircraft, better radar, and better fighter direction. The Japanese plan, like the plan at Midway, depended on surprise and on the skill of its pilots, and neither was present in June 1944.

The American Carrier Force

The American carrier force at the Philippine Sea was Task Force 58, under Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher, and it was the most powerful naval force ever assembled up to that point. Task Force 58 included fifteen carriers, seven fast battleships, and many cruisers and destroyers, and it carried about 900 aircraft, including the F6F Hellcat fighter, the SB2C Helldiver dive bomber, and the TBF Avenger torpedo bomber.

The Hellcat, in particular, was superior to the Japanese Zero in speed, armour, and firepower, and American pilots, who had been trained in the United States and who had gained experience in combat, were far better prepared than their Japanese counterparts.

The American carriers were also equipped with radar, which allowed them to detect incoming Japanese aircraft at long range and to direct their fighters to intercept them, and with combat information centres, which coordinated the defence of the fleet. The American force was therefore not only larger than the Japanese force, but also better equipped and better trained, and it was ready for the battle that Ozawa was bringing to it.

3. Opposing Forces

Task Force 58: The US Fast Carrier Force

Task Force 58 was organised into four task groups, each centred on a group of carriers and supported by battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. The task groups were commanded by Rear Admirals Joseph Clark, Alfred Montgomery, William Harrill, and Ralph Davison, and they operated together under Mitscher, who was aboard the carrier Lexington.

The carriers themselves were a mixture of large fleet carriers, such as the Essex, Lexington, and Enterprise, and light carriers, such as the Independence and the Belleau Wood, and they carried a total of about 900 aircraft. The battleships, including the Iowa, New Jersey, and Washington, provided anti-aircraft fire and protected the carriers from surface attack, while the cruisers and destroyers formed a screen around the carriers.

The American force was well supplied and well organised, and it had been at sea for weeks, supporting the landings on Saipan and preparing for the Japanese attack. The American sailors and airmen were confident, and they knew that they had the advantage in numbers, in equipment, and in training.

US Aircraft and Pilots

The American aircraft at the Philippine Sea were superior to the Japanese aircraft in almost every respect, and the American pilots were far better trained. The F6F Hellcat, which made up the bulk of the American fighter force, was faster, more heavily armed, and more heavily armoured than the Japanese A6M Zero, and it could out-climb and out-dive the Zero in combat.

The American dive bombers and torpedo bombers were also superior, and they were flown by pilots who had been trained in the United States and who had gained experience in the earlier battles of the Pacific. The Japanese pilots, by contrast, were mostly new recruits who had received only a fraction of the training that American pilots had received, and many of them had never flown in combat before.

The difference in training was the result of Japan’s losses at Midway and in the Solomons, where it had lost its best pilots, and of the American training programme, which produced thousands of new pilots every year. The battle of the Philippine Sea, therefore, was not just a battle of ships and aircraft, but a battle of training systems, and the American system won decisively.

The Japanese Mobile Fleet

The Japanese Mobile Fleet under Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa was the last great carrier force that Japan could put to sea, and it was made up of nine carriers, five battleships, and many cruisers and destroyers. The carriers included the Taiho, the newest and largest Japanese carrier, the Shokaku and Zuikaku, veterans of Pearl Harbor, and six smaller carriers.

The fleet carried about 430 aircraft, which was less than half the American total, and many of those aircraft were flown by inexperienced pilots. Ozawa was a capable and intelligent commander, and he understood the weakness of his force, but he was ordered to attack, and he did so with determination.

His plan was to use the greater range of his aircraft to attack the American carriers from a distance, and to use land-based aircraft from Guam to support the attack, but the plan failed because the American fighters intercepted his aircraft before they could reach the carriers, and because American submarines sank two of his carriers on the first day.

The Mobile Fleet was the last hope of the Japanese Navy, and its destruction at the Philippine Sea marked the end of Japan’s carrier power.

4. The Battle

19 June: The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot

The battle began on 19 June 1944, when Ozawa launched four waves of carrier aircraft against the American fleet, in the hope of overwhelming the American defences. The first wave, of about 70 aircraft, was detected by American radar at long range, and American Hellcats were directed to intercept it.

The Hellcats shot down most of the Japanese aircraft before they could reach the carriers, and the few that got through were shot down by anti-aircraft fire from the American ships. The second, third, and fourth waves met the same fate, and by the end of the day the Americans had shot down about 300 Japanese carrier aircraft, plus about 100 land-based aircraft from Guam, for the loss of only about 30 American aircraft.

The day became known as the “Great Marianas Turkey Shoot”, because American pilots described the Japanese aircraft as easy targets, like turkeys in a shooting gallery. The Japanese pilots, who were inexperienced and who were flying aircraft that were inferior to the Hellcat, were no match for the American fighters, and the battle became a one-sided slaughter in the air.

Submarines Sink the Taiho and Shokaku

While the air battle was being fought on 19 June, American submarines were also playing a decisive role, sinking two of the largest Japanese carriers. The submarine Albacore, under Commander James Blanchard, fired a spread of torpedoes at the Taiho, Ozawa’s flagship, and one of them hit the carrier, starting a fire and causing damage that the Japanese damage-control parties were unable to control.

The Taiho, which was the newest and most advanced Japanese carrier, sank in the afternoon, with the loss of about 1,650 men. At the same time, the submarine Cavalla, under Commander Herman Kossler, fired torpedoes at the Shokaku, a veteran of Pearl Harbor, and three of them hit the carrier, which sank with the loss of about 1,270 men.

The loss of the Taiho and the Shokaku, two of Japan’s best carriers, was a severe blow to Ozawa, and it reduced his fleet to seven carriers, with far fewer aircraft than before. The submarine attacks showed the importance of American submarines in the Pacific war, and they were a key part of the American victory at the Philippine Sea.

20 June: The American Counter-Attack

On 20 June 1944, after the Japanese air attacks had failed, Mitscher launched a counter-attack against the Japanese fleet, sending more than 200 aircraft to find and sink Ozawa’s carriers. The American aircraft flew to the limit of their range, about 300 nautical miles, and they found the Japanese fleet in the late afternoon, just before sunset.

The American pilots attacked the Japanese carriers, sinking the Hiyo and damaging several other ships, including the Zuikaku and the Chiyoda, and shooting down about 80 more Japanese aircraft. The attack was successful, but it was carried out at such long range that many of the American aircraft ran out of fuel on the way back, and about 80 of them were lost, though most of their pilots were rescued by American destroyers and submarines.

Mitscher’s decision to launch the attack, even though it meant that many of his aircraft might not return, was a bold one, and it was praised afterwards as an example of aggressive leadership. The counter-attack on 20 June completed the American victory, and Ozawa’s fleet retreated to Japan, having lost three carriers and most of its aircraft.

5. Turning Point

The Destruction of Japanese Naval Air Power

The turning point of the Battle of the Philippine Sea was the air battle on 19 June, when the Americans shot down about 600 Japanese aircraft and destroyed the Japanese carrier air groups. The loss of so many aircraft and pilots was irrecoverable for Japan, because it had no reserves of trained pilots to replace them, and because its aircraft production could not keep up with the losses.

The Japanese Navy had lost its best pilots at Midway and in the Solomons, and the pilots who fought at the Philippine Sea were inexperienced replacements who were no match for the Americans. The destruction of Japanese naval air power at the Philippine Sea meant that Japan could no longer challenge the United States at sea, and that its remaining carriers would have to be used as decoys, as they were at Leyte Gulf four months later.

The battle, therefore, was not just a tactical victory for the Americans, but a strategic victory that ended Japan’s ability to fight a carrier war.

The Loss of the Taiho and Shokaku

The loss of the Taiho and Shokaku on 19 June was also a turning point, because it deprived Ozawa of two of his best carriers and showed that American submarines could sink even the largest Japanese ships. The Taiho, which was the newest Japanese carrier and which had been designed to be unsinkable, was lost because of a single torpedo hit and poor damage control, while the Shokaku, a veteran of Pearl Harbor, was lost to three torpedoes from the Cavalla.

The loss of the two carriers reduced Ozawa’s fleet and demoralised his crews, and it showed that the Japanese Navy, which had once been the most powerful in the Pacific, was now vulnerable to American submarines and aircraft. The sinking of the Taiho and Shokaku, together with the loss of so many aircraft, meant that the Japanese fleet could not recover, and that the battle was lost before the American counter-attack on 20 June had even begun.

The Securing of the Marianas

The securing of the Marianas was the strategic result of the American victory at the Philippine Sea, and it was the turning point in the Pacific war. With the Japanese fleet defeated and the Japanese air power destroyed, the American landings on Saipan, Tinian, and Guam could proceed without interference from the sea, and the islands were captured in the summer of 1944.

From the Marianas, American B-29 bombers could fly to Japan, and the bombing of the Japanese home islands began in November 1944. The Marianas also provided bases for the American advance towards the Philippines, which were liberated in 1944–1945, and towards Okinawa and Japan itself.

The battle of the Philippine Sea, therefore, was a turning point not only in the naval war but in the whole Pacific campaign, because it secured the bases from which the final attacks on Japan would be launched. The islands also gave the Americans harbours, airfields, and supply bases that could support the next operations, and they removed the last Japanese bases from which aircraft could threaten the American fleet in the central Pacific.

6. Casualties and Losses

US Losses

American losses at the Battle of the Philippine Sea were light, especially when compared with the Japanese losses, and they showed the superiority of American training, equipment, and tactics. The Americans lost about 130 aircraft, most of them on 20 June, when many aircraft ran out of fuel on the way back from the attack on the Japanese fleet, and about 150 men were killed, including pilots and sailors.

The battleship South Dakota was damaged by a bomb, but no American ship was sunk, and the carriers, which had been the target of the Japanese attack, were undamaged. The light American losses were a testament to the skill of the American pilots and to the effectiveness of American radar and fighter direction, which allowed the Americans to intercept the Japanese aircraft before they could reach the carriers.

The American victory was therefore not only decisive but also economical, and it showed that the United States could win a carrier battle without suffering heavy losses.

The Rescue of American Pilots

The rescue of American pilots on 20 June was one of the most remarkable features of the battle, and it showed the value that the US Navy placed on its airmen. When Mitscher launched the counter-attack on 20 June, he knew that many of his aircraft would run out of fuel on the way back, and he ordered his carriers to turn on their lights, even though that made them vulnerable to Japanese submarines, so that the returning pilots could find their way home.

Many of the pilots ditched in the sea, and they were rescued by American destroyers and submarines, which had been positioned to pick them up. Of the about 80 aircraft that were lost on 20 June, most of their pilots were rescued, and only a small number were killed.

The rescue effort was a tribute to the courage of the destroyer crews and to the leadership of Mitscher, who was willing to risk his carriers to save his pilots.

Japanese Losses

Japanese losses at the Battle of the Philippine Sea were catastrophic, and they marked the end of the Imperial Japanese Navy as an effective carrier force. The Japanese lost three carriers, the Taiho, Shokaku, and Hiyo, and about 600 aircraft, including both carrier aircraft and land-based aircraft from Guam, and about 2,000–3,000 men were killed, including many experienced officers and pilots.

The loss of so many aircraft and pilots was irrecoverable, because Japan had no training programme that could produce replacements quickly, and because its aircraft factories could not build enough new aircraft to replace those that had been lost. The Japanese Navy never recovered from the Philippine Sea, and its remaining carriers were used as decoys at Leyte Gulf, where they were sunk without aircraft.

The battle, therefore, was a disaster for Japan, and it hastened the end of the war in the Pacific. The loss of trained aircrew was especially damaging, because Japan could not train replacements quickly, and the surviving carriers were left without the pilots and aircraft they needed to fight another major battle at sea.

7. Map and Geography

The Philippine Sea and the Marianas

The Philippine Sea is a large body of water west of the Mariana Islands, bounded by the Philippines to the west, Japan to the north, and the Marianas to the east, and it was the scene of the largest carrier battle of the Second World War.

The Marianas themselves are a chain of islands that stretch from north to south, with Saipan, Tinian, and Guam the largest and most important, and they were the objective of the American invasion in June 1944. The Japanese fleet sailed from the Philippines, through the San Bernardino Strait, and into the Philippine Sea, where it hoped to meet the American fleet west of the Marianas.

The American fleet, which was covering the landings on Saipan, was positioned east of the Marianas, between the islands and the Japanese fleet, and the battle was fought in the open sea, far from land, where the only landmarks were the islands themselves.

The geography of the Philippine Sea, with its vast distances and its scattered islands, made the battle a test of range, of radar, and of the ability to find and attack an enemy fleet at sea.

Guam, Rota, and Land-Based Air Power

Guam and Rota, two of the Mariana Islands, were used by the Japanese as bases for land-based aircraft, which were supposed to support Ozawa’s carriers in the attack on the American fleet. The Japanese aircraft from Guam flew out to meet the American carriers, but they were intercepted by American fighters and shot down, and the airfields on Guam were bombed by American carrier aircraft, which destroyed many of the Japanese aircraft on the ground.

The use of land-based air power, which had been a key part of the Japanese plan, failed because the Japanese aircraft were inferior to the American aircraft and because their pilots were inexperienced. The islands of Guam and Rota, therefore, became a liability for the Japanese, rather than an asset, and their loss, when the Americans captured Guam in July 1944, removed the last Japanese air bases in the Marianas.

The geography of the Marianas, with its islands that could be used as unsinkable aircraft carriers, was important, but it was not enough to save the Japanese fleet.

The Range Problem

The range problem was central to the Battle of the Philippine Sea, because the Japanese aircraft had a longer range than the American aircraft, and Ozawa hoped to use that advantage to attack the American carriers from a distance. The Japanese aircraft could fly about 300 nautical miles to attack and then return to their carriers, while the American aircraft had a shorter range and would have to fly further to reach the Japanese fleet.

In practice, the range advantage did not help the Japanese, because the American fighters intercepted their aircraft before they could reach the carriers, and because the Japanese pilots, who were inexperienced, were unable to find the American fleet or to press home their attacks.

The American counter-attack on 20 June, by contrast, was flown at the limit of American range, and it succeeded even though many of the aircraft ran out of fuel on the way back. The range problem, therefore, was not decisive, because the quality of the pilots and the aircraft mattered more than the range, and the Americans, who had better pilots and better aircraft, won the battle despite the range disadvantage.

8. Outcome and Legacy

A Decisive American Victory

The outcome of the Battle of the Philippine Sea was a decisive American victory, and it ended the Japanese Navy’s ability to challenge the United States at sea. The Japanese lost three carriers and about 600 aircraft, and their carrier air power was destroyed, while the Americans lost no ships and only about 130 aircraft.

The victory secured the Marianas, from which American bombers would fly to Japan, and it opened the way for the liberation of the Philippines and the final advance towards Japan. The battle also showed the superiority of American carrier doctrine, with its emphasis on radar, fighter direction, and the coordination of carriers, battleships, and submarines, over Japanese doctrine, which relied on the skill of individual pilots and on the range of its aircraft.

The American victory at the Philippine Sea was one of the most complete naval victories of the Second World War, and it marked the point at which the United States achieved command of the sea in the Pacific.

The End of Japanese Carrier Power

The legacy of the Philippine Sea includes the end of Japanese carrier power, which was never restored after June 1944. The Japanese carriers that survived the battle, including the Zuikaku, were used as decoys at the Battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944, where they were sunk without aircraft, because Japan had no pilots to fly from them.

The Japanese Navy, which had once been the most powerful in the Pacific, was reduced to a fleet of battleships and cruisers that could not operate without air cover, and it was unable to prevent the American advance towards Japan.

The battle, therefore, marked the end of an era in naval warfare, in which carriers had replaced battleships as the main weapon at sea, and it showed that the country that could train the most pilots and build the most aircraft would win the war at sea.

The legacy of the Philippine Sea is still studied by naval historians today, as an example of how technology, training, and doctrine can decide a battle.

The Marianas and the Bombing of Japan

The Marianas, which were secured by the American victory at the Philippine Sea, became the bases from which American B-29 bombers flew to Japan, beginning in November 1944. The bombing of Japan from the Marianas was a major part of the American strategy to force Japan to surrender, and it culminated in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945.

The battle of the Philippine Sea, therefore, had a direct connection to the end of the war, because it secured the bases that made the bombing of Japan possible. The legacy of the battle, however, is not only military, but also human, because the bombing of Japan from the Marianas caused great suffering to Japanese civilians, and the decision to bomb Japanese cities remains controversial.

The battle of the Philippine Sea is remembered as a naval victory, but its consequences extended far beyond the sea, to the cities of Japan and to the end of the war itself.

9. Commanders

Admiral Raymond Spruance

Admiral Raymond Spruance commanded the US Fifth Fleet at the Philippine Sea, and he was one of the most successful American admirals of the Second World War. Spruance had commanded the American force at the Battle of Midway in 1942, where he had won a decisive victory, and he was known for his calm, methodical, and cautious style, which contrasted with the more aggressive style of Admiral William Halsey.

At the Philippine Sea, Spruance’s decision to stay close to Saipan, to protect the landings, rather than chasing Ozawa’s fleet, has been debated ever since. Some historians have argued that Spruance was too cautious and that he missed an opportunity to destroy the Japanese fleet completely, while others have argued that his first duty was to protect the landings on Saipan, and that he did so successfully.

Spruance’s conduct at the Philippine Sea showed his priorities: the protection of the amphibious force came first, and the destruction of the Japanese fleet came second. His victory was complete, even if it was not as complete as it might have been.

Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher

Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher commanded Task Force 58 at the Philippine Sea, and he was the officer who directed the carrier battle itself. Mitscher was a pioneer of naval aviation, and he was known for his aggressive and innovative style, which contrasted with Spruance’s caution.

Mitscher’s decision to launch the counter-attack on 20 June, even though it meant that many of his aircraft might not return, was a bold one, and it completed the American victory. Mitscher also ordered his carriers to turn on their lights on the night of 20 June, to guide the returning pilots home, a decision that risked his ships but saved many of his airmen.

Mitscher’s leadership at the Philippine Sea was praised by his superiors, and he went on to command the carrier force at Leyte Gulf and at Okinawa. His conduct showed that a carrier commander must be willing to take risks, and that the lives of pilots are as important as the ships they fly from.

Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa

Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa commanded the Japanese Mobile Fleet at the Philippine Sea, and he was one of the most capable Japanese admirals of the Second World War. Ozawa understood the weakness of his force, and he knew that his pilots were inexperienced and that his aircraft were inferior to the American aircraft, but he was ordered to attack, and he did so with determination.

Ozawa’s plan, which relied on the range of his aircraft and on land-based support from Guam, was sound in theory, but it failed in practice because the American fighters were too strong and because the Japanese pilots were too inexperienced. Ozawa survived the battle, and he went on to command the decoy carrier force at Leyte Gulf, where his ships were sunk.

His conduct at the Philippine Sea has been praised for its courage, even though the battle was lost, and he is remembered as a commander who did his best with a force that was doomed from the start.

Frequently Asked Questions

When was the Battle of the Philippine Sea fought?
The battle was fought on 19–20 June 1944, west of the Mariana Islands in the western Pacific.

Why was it called the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot?
American pilots called 19 June the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot because they shot down about 600 Japanese aircraft with little difficulty, like turkeys in a shooting gallery.

How many Japanese carriers were sunk?
Three Japanese carriers were sunk: the Taiho and Shokaku on 19 June, by American submarines, and the Hiyo on 20 June, by American carrier aircraft.

How many aircraft did the Japanese lose?
The Japanese lost about 600 aircraft, including carrier aircraft and land-based aircraft from Guam, a loss from which their naval air power never recovered.

Why did the Japanese lose so badly?
Japanese pilots were inexperienced replacements for the veterans lost at Midway and in the Solomons, their aircraft were inferior to the American Hellcat, and American radar and fighter direction were far superior.

What was the strategic result of the battle?
The American victory secured the Marianas, from which B-29 bombers would fly to Japan, and it ended Japan’s ability to challenge the United States at sea.

Related articles

• Battle of Monte Cassino
• Brusilov Offensive
• Dieppe Raid

Sources

• The US Naval History and Heritage Command, Philippine Sea collection
• Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. VIII (1953)
• Ian W. Toll, The Conquering Tide: War in the Pacific Islands, 1942–1944 (2015)
• The Imperial War Museum, Pacific War collection
• The National WWII Museum, Philippine Sea resources
• John B. Lundstrom, The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign (1984)
• Wikipedia, "Battle of the Philippine Sea"