Ferdinand Foch

1. Lead

Ferdinand Foch (1851–1929) was a French general who became Supreme Allied Commander in the final year of the First World War and directed the Allied offensives that ended the conflict in November 1918. A professor of military history and a theorist of the offensive before the war, he commanded French armies at the Marne, in Flanders and on the Somme, and in the spring of 1918 he was given authority over all Allied armies on the Western Front at the moment when the German spring offensives threatened to break the Allied line.

His insistence on a single, coordinated command, his refusal to panic during the German advances, and his decision to launch a series of counter-offensives in the summer and autumn of 1918 made him the central military figure of the Allied victory.

After the war he became one of the most celebrated soldiers in France and Britain, was made a Marshal of France, an honorary field marshal of Britain and a Marshal of Poland, and took part in the Paris Peace Conference, where he criticised the Treaty of Versailles as too lenient towards Germany.

His famous remark that the treaty was “not peace, but an armistice for twenty years” has been quoted ever since, and it has shaped much of the later debate about his judgement as a soldier and as a political figure.

Foch remains a symbol of Allied unity in 1918, of the doctrine of the offensive, and of the argument that military victory must be followed by a political settlement strong enough to last.

2. Key Facts

Field	Value
Born	2 October 1851, Tarbes, France
Died	20 March 1929, Paris, France
Nationality	French
Role/Rank	General of Division; Marshal of France; Supreme Allied Commander, 1918
Known for	Supreme Allied Commander in 1918; First Battle of the Marne; Allied counter-offensives of 1918; Armistice of 11 November 1918
Wars	Franco-Prussian War (as a young officer, without combat); First World War
Awards	Marshal of France; Honorary Field Marshal of the British Army; Marshal of Poland; Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour; Distinguished Service Medal (United States)
Commands	XX Corps; Ninth Army; Northern Army Group; Supreme Allied Commander
Family	Married Julie Bienvenüe in 1883; four children, including a son and a son-in-law killed in the war
Buried	Les Invalides, Paris

3. Early Life and Education

Foch grew up in the shadow of the defeat of 1870, and the wish to restore France’s military standing shaped his choice of career. His early years as a student, an artillery officer and a teacher at the staff college gave him both the technical knowledge and the intellectual reputation that carried him to high command in 1914.

Childhood in Tarbes and the Franco-Prussian War

Ferdinand Foch was born on 2 October 1851 at Tarbes, in the Hautes-Pyrénées in south-western France, the son of Bertrand Foch, a civil servant in the prefecture, and Rose Foch. He was the eldest of four children. The family moved to Metz in 1859, when his father was posted there, and the young Foch grew up in a city that was then one of the great fortress towns of eastern France.

In 1870, at the age of eighteen, he enlisted as a volunteer during the Franco-Prussian War, but the war ended before he saw combat, and the experience left him with a lasting sense of national humiliation. The defeat of 1870–71, the loss of Alsace-Lorraine and the fall of the Second Empire formed the background of his whole career, and he belonged to the generation of French officers who were determined that France should never again be caught unprepared.

Metz was one of the great fortress towns of eastern France, and the move placed the young Foch at the heart of the military world that would shape his life.

Artillery Officer and the Staff College

After the war Foch studied at the Jesuit college of Saint-Étienne and then at the École Polytechnique, which he entered in 1871. He chose the artillery, the most technical arm of the service, and graduated to the artillery school at Fontainebleau. He served in regiments in the provinces and in Paris, and his early career was steady rather than spectacular.

In 1883 he married Julie Bienvenüe, the sister of a fellow officer, and the marriage was a long and close one. He passed the entrance examination for the École Supérieure de Guerre, the French staff college, in 1885, and graduated near the top of his class.

His performance there marked him out as an intellectual officer, and in 1895 he was appointed to the staff college as a lecturer in military history, strategy and tactics. The artillery was the most technical arm of the French army, and it gave Foch a grounding in gunnery, mathematics and organisation that stayed with him throughout his career.

Teacher of War at the École de Guerre

The Doctrine of the Offensive

For thirteen years Foch taught at the École de Guerre, and it was there that he built his reputation. His lectures, published as Des principes de la guerre in 1903 and De la conduite de la guerre in 1904, argued that war was above all a matter of will, morale and the offensive.

He drew on the campaigns of Napoleon and on the Franco-Prussian War, and he taught that a battle was won not by numbers or by firepower alone but by the commander’s determination to impose his will on the enemy. He attacked the defensive doctrines that had dominated French thinking after 1871 and insisted that the French army must attack.

His students included many of the officers who would command French armies in 1914, among them Joseph Joffre’s subordinates and the future generals of the war. His teaching was influential and controversial: critics later said that his cult of the offensive contributed to the heavy French losses of 1914, while his defenders replied that he had always insisted on the offensive combined with careful preparation and the concentration of force at the decisive point.

Commandant of the Staff College

Foch’s career advanced through staff and regimental appointments. He commanded the 35th Artillery Regiment, served as chief of staff of V Corps, and in 1907 became commandant of the École de Guerre, a post he held until 1911. He was a demanding teacher, a fluent and forceful lecturer, and a man of strong religious faith and strong opinions.

He was passed over for some of the highest peacetime appointments, partly because of his outspokenness, and in 1911 he was given command of the 13th Division at Chaumont and then, in 1913, of XX Corps at Nancy, the corps that guarded the frontier with Germany in Lorraine. It was in that command that the war found him in August 1914.

He was known as a demanding teacher and a forceful lecturer, and his students remembered his energy, his clarity and his insistence that a commander must impose his will on the enemy.

4. Rise to Prominence

Foch rose quickly once the war began, because Joffre trusted his steadiness in retreat and his determination in attack. From corps command in Lorraine to the Ninth Army at the Marne and the Northern Army Group in Flanders, each appointment brought him closer to the centre of Allied strategy.

Lorraine, Retreat and the Ninth Army

XX Corps in the Battle of the Frontiers

When the First World War began, Foch’s XX Corps formed part of the French Second Army in Lorraine. In the opening battles, his corps fought at Morhange and then took part in the retreat that followed the French defeats in the Battle of the Frontiers.

He distinguished himself by the firmness with which he handled his corps in retreat and by his refusal to allow a defeat to become a rout. In late August 1914, Joseph Joffre, the French commander-in-chief, gave him command of a new formation, the Ninth Army, created to fill the gap between the French Fourth and Fifth Armies during the retreat towards the Marne.

It was a sign of the confidence Joffre placed in him. The retreat tested every corps commander, and Foch showed a firmness in handling his troops that impressed Joffre and marked him out for higher command. He handled the retreat with a steadiness that his superiors noted, and the experience confirmed his belief that a commander must keep his nerve when the situation looks worst.

Holding the Centre at the Marne

At the First Battle of the Marne in September 1914, Foch’s Ninth Army held the centre of the Allied line against the German Second Army. His troops were hard pressed, and at one point the German advance threatened to break through.

Foch’s famous message to Joffre during the battle — that his centre was yielding, his right was retreating, and that the situation was excellent and he was attacking — has become one of the best-known quotations of the war, and although its exact wording is debated, it captures the spirit of his conduct. He ordered a counter-attack, and the German advance was halted.

The Marne saved Paris and ended the German plan for a quick victory in the west, and Foch’s part in it made his reputation. The battle saved Paris and ended the German hope of a quick victory in the west, and Foch emerged from it with a reputation as a commander who would not panic under pressure.

Northern Army Group and the Somme

Flanders and Artois

After the Marne, Foch was promoted and given command of the Northern Army Group, responsible for the French armies in Flanders and Artois. He worked closely with the British Expeditionary Force and with its commander, Sir John French, and later Sir Douglas Haig.

He directed the French effort in the First Battle of Ypres in the autumn of 1914, where the Allied line held against repeated German attacks, and in the battles of Artois in 1915. In 1916 he commanded the French armies on the Somme, where the British and French launched their great offensive on 1 July.

The Somme was a costly battle, and Foch’s part in it has been criticised for the scale of the losses, but he learned from the experience, and his insistence on the value of the artillery preparation and the methodical advance influenced later French tactics. The work required close cooperation with the British Expeditionary Force, and Foch built a relationship with its commanders that would prove essential in 1918.

The Somme and the Fall from Favour

In late 1916 and early 1917 Foch was sidelined. Joffre was replaced by Robert Nivelle, and Foch, who had criticised aspects of the planning, was sent to Italy as head of a military mission and then given a staff appointment in Paris.

The failure of the Nivelle Offensive in the spring of 1917 and the mutinies that followed in the French army led to Nivelle’s replacement by Philippe Pétain, and Foch was appointed Chief of the General Staff in May 1917. In that post he was responsible for the overall direction of French military policy, for liaison with the Allies, and for the planning of the campaigns of 1918.

He was now one of the most senior soldiers in France, and when the crisis of the spring of 1918 arrived, he was the natural choice for the Allied supreme command. The experience taught him lessons about artillery preparation and methodical advance that influenced later French tactics and his own conduct as supreme commander.

5. Ferdinand Foch’s Role in the War

The year 1918 was the decisive year of Foch’s career. Given command of all the Allied armies at the moment of greatest danger, he held the line through the German spring offensives and then directed the counter-offensives that ended the war in November.

The German Spring Offensives

Doullens and the Supreme Command

Foch’s decisive role came in 1918. On 21 March the German army launched the first of its spring offensives, Operation Michael, against the British Fifth Army on the Somme. The British line was driven back, and the Allies faced the possibility of a breakthrough that would separate the British and French armies.

At the Doullens Conference on 26 March 1918, the Allied political and military leaders agreed to give Foch the task of coordinating the action of the Allied armies on the Western Front. He was not yet supreme commander in the full sense, but he had authority to direct the operations of the French, British, American and Belgian armies, and on 14 April he was formally appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, with the power to issue orders to all national commanders.

The crisis was the worst the Allies had faced since 1914, and the political leaders agreed that only a single commander could coordinate the defence of the Western Front.

Holding the Line in Spring 1918

Foch’s first task was to hold the line. The German offensives continued through the spring: Operation Georgette in Flanders in April, Operation Blücher-Yorck on the Aisne in May, and Operation Gneisenau in June. Each time, Foch refused to commit his reserves prematurely. He held them back until the direction of the German attack was clear, and then he moved them to the threatened sector.

He accepted the loss of ground in order to preserve his armies, and he insisted that the Allies must not be drawn into a battle of attrition on ground of the enemy’s choosing. His calm under pressure impressed his Allied colleagues, and his willingness to take responsibility for difficult decisions — including the decision to allow the British to fall back in Flanders while he concentrated on the defence of Amiens — earned him the trust of Haig and of the American commander, John J.

Pershing. The German advances also carried a cost that worked in Foch’s favour: each offensive drove a deep salient into the Allied line, lengthening German supply lines and exhausting the elite stormtrooper units whose losses Germany, short of manpower by 1918, could not replace.

The Counter-Offensives and the Armistice

The Second Marne and Amiens

In July 1918 the tide turned. The German offensive on the Marne, Operation Friedensturm, was halted, and on 18 July Foch launched the counter-offensive at the Second Battle of the Marne, using French and American troops under Charles Mangin and Henri Gouraud. The German salient was reduced, and the initiative passed to the Allies. Foch now directed a series of coordinated offensives that became known as the Hundred Days Offensive.

On 8 August the British Fourth Army under Henry Rawlinson attacked at Amiens, with tanks and aircraft in support, and the German army suffered what its own commander, Erich Ludendorff, called the black day of the German army. Foch followed up with attacks by the French, British and American armies along the whole front, keeping the Germans under constant pressure and denying them the chance to regroup.

The German salient was reduced and the initiative passed to the Allies, and Foch now believed that a general offensive could drive the German army back across the whole front.

The Hundred Days and Compiègne

The climax came in the autumn. Foch planned a general offensive in which the American First Army under Pershing attacked in the Meuse-Argonne, the British attacked towards Cambrai and the French attacked in Champagne. The Hindenburg Line, the great German defensive system, was breached in late September and early October, and the German army began a retreat that it could not stop.

Foch insisted that the offensives continue without pause, and he rejected proposals for a negotiated peace that would have left the German army intact in France and Belgium. He demanded that Germany accept an armistice on Allied terms, and he was the Allied representative who received the German delegation at Compiègne.

On 11 November 1918, at 5 a.m., he signed the Armistice, which came into effect at 11 a.m. that day. The war in the west was over, and Foch was its victor. The German army began a retreat that it could not stop, and Foch insisted that the offensives continue without pause until Germany accepted an armistice on Allied terms.

6. Key Decisions

Foch’s command in 1918 turned on a small number of decisions, each taken under great pressure and each with consequences for the whole Allied effort. Together they show a commander who valued unity of command, the careful use of reserves and the willingness to attack once the enemy was exhausted.

Decisions of Command in 1918

Accepting Unified Command and Holding the Reserves

Several decisions define Foch’s command in 1918. The first was his acceptance of the supreme command itself. Before March 1918 there had been no single Allied commander, and national armies had cooperated through liaison and through conferences. Foch insisted that coordination was not enough and that a single commander must have the authority to move reserves and to order attacks. He accepted the post knowing that it would bring him into conflict with national commanders and governments, and he used the authority with a firmness that surprised some of his colleagues.

The second was his handling of the reserves in the spring of 1918. He refused to commit the Allied general reserve to the first German attack, and he resisted pressure from Haig and from Pétain to send French divisions to Flanders or to hold them in the south. He kept his reserves in hand until the German intention was clear, and he then moved them by rail and by road to the decisive point. This was a gamble, because it meant accepting the loss of ground, but it preserved the Allied armies and allowed him to strike back when the German offensives had spent themselves.

Counter-Attack and the Armistice Terms

The third was the decision to counter-attack at the Marne in July 1918 rather than to remain on the defensive. Foch judged that the German army was exhausted and that its lines of communication were overstretched, and he ordered Mangin to attack the flank of the German salient. The success of that attack convinced him that the Allies could now take the offensive on a broad front, and he planned the Hundred Days Offensive as a series of successive attacks by different national armies, each one preventing the Germans from reinforcing the next.

The fourth was his insistence on continuing the offensive in the autumn of 1918 until Germany accepted an armistice on Allied terms. He rejected the idea of a pause or of a negotiated settlement that would have allowed the German army to withdraw in good order, and he demanded terms that included the evacuation of occupied territory, the surrender of war material and the occupation of the Rhineland. He believed that only a complete military defeat would convince Germany that the war was lost, and he argued that a compromise peace would leave the causes of the war unresolved.

The Decision on the Peace

A fifth decision, taken after the war, was his opposition to the Treaty of Versailles. Foch argued that the treaty did not give France the security it needed, above all because it did not give France the Rhine frontier or a permanent military guarantee.

He wanted the Rhineland to be held by the Allies and the German army to be limited in size, and he criticised the political leaders for making concessions that, in his view, would allow Germany to recover and to threaten France again. His criticism was influential, and it has been debated ever since.

He argued that without the Rhine frontier and a permanent military guarantee, France would remain exposed to a German recovery, and his criticism shaped the later debate about the peace settlement. He believed that the security of France depended on a settlement that Germany could not easily overturn, and he returned to this argument repeatedly in the years after the war, in speeches and in his memoirs.

7. Controversies

Foch’s reputation has been debated ever since the war, and the debate covers his teaching before 1914, his conduct of the Somme, his direction of the offensives of 1918 and his criticism of the peace settlement. Both his admirers and his critics have found evidence in his long and very public career.

The Offensive Doctrine and the Somme

The Cult of the Offensive

Foch’s reputation has been the subject of considerable debate. The first controversy concerns his pre-war doctrine of the offensive. Critics have argued that his teaching at the École de Guerre encouraged the French army to attack without sufficient regard for firepower, and that it contributed to the heavy French losses in the opening battles of 1914, when French infantry in red trousers advanced against German machine guns and artillery.

His defenders reply that Foch always insisted on the combination of the offensive with careful preparation, on the use of artillery and on the concentration of force, and that the losses of 1914 were due as much to the French high command’s plan and to the German superiority in heavy artillery as to his teaching.

Historians now generally agree that his doctrine was more nuanced than the caricature of a blind cult of the attack, but that it did encourage an optimism about the offensive that the experience of the war did not support.

The Somme in 1916

A second controversy concerns the Somme in 1916. Foch commanded the French armies in the battle, and the French attack on 1 July was more successful than the British attack, but the battle as a whole was enormously costly. Some historians have criticised him for persisting with the offensive long after it had ceased to achieve its objectives, while others argue that the Somme wore down the German army and prepared the way for the Allied victories of 1918.

The debate reflects the wider argument about the strategy of attrition on the Western Front. The battle wore down the German army over months of fighting, and historians still disagree about whether the cost was justified by the results that were achieved.

Some historians argue that the battle exhausted the German army and prepared the way for later victories, while others insist that the same result could have been achieved at a far lower cost in lives.

Supreme Command and Versailles

Command in 1918

A third controversy concerns his conduct as supreme commander in 1918. Some British historians have argued that Foch’s direction of the Hundred Days Offensive was less decisive than the work of Haig and of the British and Dominion armies, and that his role was to coordinate rather than to command.

Others have argued that without his insistence on a single command and on continuous pressure, the Allied offensives would have been piecemeal and the Germans would have had time to recover. The truth lies between the two views: Foch provided the strategic direction and the coordination, while the national commanders planned and executed the individual battles.

The debate reflects the wider argument about how much of the victory of 1918 should be credited to Foch and how much to the national commanders and their armies. British historians in particular have stressed the part played by Haig and by the British and Dominion armies, while French historians have stressed the importance of Foch’s coordination of the whole Allied effort.

Criticism of the Treaty

A fourth controversy concerns his criticism of the Treaty of Versailles. Foch’s remark about an armistice for twenty years has been quoted as a prophecy, and his supporters have argued that he was right to warn that the treaty was too lenient.

His critics reply that his demand for the Rhine frontier was unrealistic and that it would have created a resentful Germany and a permanent French occupation that the Allies were not willing to sustain. They also point out that his prediction was not a prophecy in the strict sense, since the Second World War had many causes besides the terms of Versailles.

The debate about Versailles continues, and Foch’s part in it remains one of the most discussed aspects of his career. The debate about Versailles continues, and Foch’s part in it remains one of the most discussed aspects of his career as a soldier and as a public figure.

8. Later Life and Death

After the Armistice, Foch remained a public figure for another decade, enforcing the peace terms, advising the French delegation at Paris and speaking on the security of France. His retirement did not end his influence, and his death in 1929 was marked as a national event.

Enforcing the Armistice and the Peace Conference

After the Armistice, Foch remained Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies and was responsible for the enforcement of the Armistice terms and for the occupation of the Rhineland. He took part in the Paris Peace Conference as the principal military adviser to the French delegation, and he argued forcefully, and unsuccessfully, for a stronger settlement.

On 13 April 1923 he was made a Marshal of Poland and in 1920 he was appointed to command the Allied forces in the plebiscite areas of Upper Silesia. He was a national hero in France, and he received honours from many countries, including the honorary rank of field marshal in Britain.

He was responsible for the occupation of the Rhineland and for the enforcement of the Armistice terms, and he took part in the peace conference as the principal military adviser to France. He argued forcefully and at length, but the political leaders were not willing to accept his demands, and the final treaty reflected a compromise between French security and the views of Britain and the United States.

Retirement, Memoirs and Death

Retirement and Public Life

Foch retired from active service in 1923, but he remained a public figure. He wrote his memoirs, which were published in 1931 after his death, and he continued to speak on military and political questions. He was a member of the Académie française, elected in 1918, and he took part in the ceremonies that marked the tenth anniversary of the Armistice in 1928.

His health declined in the late 1920s, and he died in Paris on 20 March 1929, at the age of seventy-seven. He was given a state funeral, and he was buried at Les Invalides, alongside Napoleon and other great French soldiers. The funeral was attended by representatives of the Allied nations, and it marked the end of an era in French military history.

He remained a public figure and continued to speak on military and political questions, and he was elected to the Académie française in 1918 in recognition of his writings and his career.

Family Loss and Character

His personal life had been marked by loss. His son Germain was killed at the front in 1914, and his son-in-law was also killed in the war. Foch bore these losses with a stoicism that impressed those who knew him, and he rarely spoke of them in public. He was a devout Catholic, and his faith was an important part of his character.

He was known for his energy, his humour and his directness, and for a command style that combined intellectual clarity with a willingness to take risks. He was a devout Catholic, and his faith was an important part of his character, together with his energy, his humour and his directness in dealing with colleagues and subordinates.

He rarely spoke in public about the deaths of his son and his son-in-law, and those who knew him admired the quiet stoicism with which he bore a loss that many French families shared.

9. Legacy

Foch left a legacy that is both military and political. As a commander he showed how a coalition could be led by a single general, and as a critic of the Treaty of Versailles he left a warning about the peace that is still quoted whenever the settlement of 1919 is discussed.

Commander and National Hero

A Model for Coalition War

Foch’s legacy is that of the commander who unified the Allied effort in 1918 and led it to victory. The appointment of a supreme commander in March 1918 was a turning point in the history of coalition warfare, and it became a model for the Allied command arrangements of the Second World War, when Dwight D. Eisenhower was appointed Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.

Foch’s insistence on unity of command, on the concentration of reserves and on the continuous offensive has been studied in military academies ever since. His insistence on unity of command, on the concentration of reserves and on the continuous offensive has been studied in military academies ever since the war ended.

The appointment of a single supreme commander in March 1918 showed that a coalition could be given unity of direction, and the arrangement was studied closely when the Allies planned their command structure for the Second World War.

Remembrance in France and Abroad

In France, Foch is remembered as one of the great marshals, alongside Joffre and Pétain, although Pétain’s later reputation was destroyed by his collaboration with Germany in the Second World War. Streets, squares and schools in France are named after Foch, and his statue stands in Paris and in other French cities.

In Britain he is remembered as the Allied commander who worked closely with Haig and who was made an honorary field marshal, and in Poland he is remembered for his support for Polish independence. The avenue Foch in Paris, one of the widest avenues in the city, bears his name.

Streets, squares and schools in France are named after Foch, and his statue stands in Paris and in other French cities, while the avenue Foch is one of the widest in the capital. In Britain he is remembered as the Allied commander who worked closely with Haig and who received the honorary rank of field marshal, and in Poland he is remembered for his support for Polish independence after the war.

Writings and the Versailles Warning

His writings on war, above all Des principes de la guerre, remain part of the literature of military theory, and they are still read for their emphasis on morale, on will and on the human element in war. His criticism of the Treaty of Versailles has also become part of his legacy, and it is quoted whenever the peace settlement of 1919 is discussed.

Whether he was right or wrong about Versailles, his warning that a peace that did not settle the question of German power would not last has shaped the way historians think about the interwar period. Whether he was right or wrong about Versailles, his warning that a peace which did not settle the question of German power would not last has shaped the way historians think about the interwar period.

10. Assessment by Historians

Historians have judged Foch in different ways at different times, and the judgement has moved from admiration in the interwar years through criticism in the later twentieth century to a more balanced assessment in recent scholarship. The three views are set out below.

The Traditional View and the Revisionists

Architect of Victory

Historians have assessed Foch in different ways. The traditional view, dominant in France and in Britain in the interwar period, presented him as the architect of victory, the soldier who saved the Allies in the spring of 1918 and led them to triumph in the autumn.

This view emphasised his energy, his optimism and his strategic sense, and it treated his appointment as supreme commander as the decisive event of 1918. This view emphasised his energy, his optimism and his strategic sense, and it presented his appointment as the moment when the Allied effort finally acquired a single direction and purpose.

Biographers in this tradition, including his own memoirs and the early biographies by French and British writers, portrayed him as a man of exceptional character and judgement. Biographers in this tradition portrayed him as a man of exceptional character and judgement, and they treated his appointment as supreme commander as the decisive event of 1918.

The Critical Reassessment

A more critical view emerged in the later twentieth century. Historians of the Western Front questioned whether Foch’s direction of the Hundred Days Offensive was as decisive as the traditional account claimed, and they pointed to the role of Haig, of the British and Dominion armies, and of the American Expeditionary Forces in the victories of 1918. They also criticised his pre-war doctrine and his conduct on the Somme.

This revisionist view did not deny his importance, but it placed him in a broader context and argued that the Allied victory was the product of many factors, including the exhaustion of Germany, the arrival of American troops and the cumulative effect of four years of attrition.

This revisionist view did not deny his importance, but it placed him in a broader context and argued that the Allied victory was the product of many factors working together. They pointed to the exhaustion of Germany, to the arrival of American troops and to the cumulative effect of four years of attrition, and they argued that no single commander could claim the victory alone.

The Balanced Consensus

More recent scholarship has sought a balanced assessment. It acknowledges that Foch’s appointment as supreme commander was a crucial political and military step, that his handling of the reserves in the spring of 1918 was sound, and that his decision to launch a general offensive in the summer and autumn was correct.

It also acknowledges that his pre-war teaching contributed to an over-optimistic view of the offensive, that his criticism of Versailles was based on a French view of security that the other Allies did not share, and that his role in 1918 was that of a coordinator and strategist rather than a battlefield commander in the narrow sense.

The consensus now is that Foch was a very able commander whose greatest achievement was to provide the unity of direction that the Allies had lacked, and that without him the victory of 1918 would have been slower and more costly, even if it would probably still have come.

Frequently Asked Questions

Who was Ferdinand Foch?
Ferdinand Foch was a French general and Marshal of France who became Supreme Allied Commander in 1918 and directed the Allied offensives that ended the First World War. He had previously commanded French armies at the Marne, in Flanders and on the Somme.

What was Foch’s role at the Battle of the Marne in 1914?
He commanded the French Ninth Army in the centre of the Allied line. His troops held against the German Second Army and then counter-attacked, helping to halt the German advance on Paris and to end the German plan for a quick victory.

When did Foch become Supreme Allied Commander?
He was given the task of coordinating the Allied armies on 26 March 1918 at the Doullens Conference, and on 14 April 1918 he was formally appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, with authority over the French, British, American and Belgian forces on the Western Front.

What did Foch say about the Treaty of Versailles?
He criticised the treaty as too lenient towards Germany and is reported to have said that it was not peace but an armistice for twenty years. He wanted France to have the Rhine frontier and a stronger military guarantee.

Why is Foch important in military history?
He was the first commander to exercise unified command over a coalition of armies in a major war, and his appointment in 1918 became a model for coalition command in the Second World War. His writings on the principles of war also remain influential.

Where is Ferdinand Foch buried?
He is buried at Les Invalides in Paris, alongside other great French soldiers. He died in Paris on 20 March 1929 at the age of seventy-seven.

Related articles

• August von Mackensen
• Erich Ludendorff
• Friedrich Paulus

Sources

• Ferdinand Foch, Memoirs, published 1931
• Jean Autin, Foch ou le triomphe de la volonté, 1987
• Elizabeth Greenhalgh, Foch in Command: The Forging of a First World War General, 2011
• Basil Liddell Hart, Foch: The Man of Orleans, 1931
• Michael Neiberg, Foch, Supreme Allied Commander in the Great War, 2003
• Official History of the Great War, British official history volumes on 1918
• Wikipedia, "Ferdinand Foch"