Erich Ludendorff

1. Lead

Erich Ludendorff (1865–1937) was a German general who was, with Paul von Hindenburg, the architect of Germany’s victories on the Eastern Front in the First World War, and who later became the effective dictator of Germany’s war effort and one of the most controversial figures in German history.

As chief of staff to Hindenburg, he planned the encirclement of the Russian Second Army at Tannenberg in August 1914, one of the great victories of the war, and he directed the German offensives on the Eastern Front for the next three years.

In 1916 he became First Quartermaster-General, the second-in-command of the German army, and he took control of the German war economy, of the home front and, increasingly, of German policy. He planned the great offensives of the spring of 1918, which came close to winning the war in the west, and he was the man who, in September 1918, told the German government that the war was lost and that an armistice must be sought.

After the war he became a leading figure of the German far right, promoting the “stab-in-the-back” legend that Germany had been betrayed by Jews and socialists, taking part in the Kapp Putsch of 1920 and in Hitler’s Beer Hall Putsch of 1923, and writing books that blamed Germany’s defeat on a conspiracy of Jews, Freemasons and Catholics.

Historians are divided about him: some praise his military talent and his energy, while others condemn his political judgement and his role in the rise of the far right. This article presents both sides, drawing on German and Allied sources, and it does not take a single view. Ludendorff remains one of the most important and most controversial German figures of the twentieth century.

2. Key Facts

Field	Value
Born	9 April 1865, Kruszewnia, Posen, Prussia
Died	20 December 1937, Munich, Germany
Nationality	German (Prussian)
Role/Rank	General of the Infantry; First Quartermaster-General, 1916–1918
Known for	Tannenberg, 1914; Eastern Front campaigns; 1918 spring offensives; “stab-in-the-back” legend; Kapp Putsch; Beer Hall Putsch
Wars	First World War
Awards	Pour le Mérite with Oak Leaves; Grand Cross of the Iron Cross; Knight of the Order of the Black Eagle
Commands	Deputy Chief of Staff, Eighth Army; Chief of Staff, Eastern Front; First Quartermaster-General
Family	Married Margarethe Pernet in 1909; four stepchildren; second marriage to Mathilde von Kemnitz in 1926
Buried	Tutzing, Bavaria

3. Early Life and Education

Childhood in Posen and the Cadet Schools

Erich Ludendorff was born on 9 April 1865 at Kruszewnia, near Posen in Prussia (now Poznań, Poland), the son of Wilhelm Ludendorff, a landowner and a former officer, and Clara von Tempelhoff. He grew up in a Prussian family of the landed gentry, and he was educated at the cadet schools at Plön and at Gross-Lichterfelde, where he was a hard-working and ambitious student.

He joined the Prussian army in 1882 as a second lieutenant in the 57th Infantry Regiment, and he was noted for his energy, his intelligence and his determination. He was a tall, heavily built man, with a strong will and a direct manner, and he was known for his capacity for work and for his impatience with those he regarded as lazy or incompetent.

He attended the Prussian War Academy in Berlin from 1893 to 1896, where he graduated at the top of his class, and he was appointed to the General Staff, the elite of the German army.

The General Staff and the Schlieffen Plan

Ludendorff’s career in the General Staff was marked by rapid promotion and by a reputation for brilliance. He served in the operations section, where he worked on the plans for a war against France and Russia, and he became one of the principal authors of the Schlieffen Plan, the German plan for a quick victory in the west.

He was responsible for the detailed planning of the attack on the Belgian fortress of Liège, and he argued forcefully for the strengthening of the German right wing, which was to sweep through Belgium and encircle Paris. He was a man of strong opinions, and he quarrelled with his superiors over the plan, which led to his transfer from the General Staff in 1913 to a regimental command at Düsseldorf.

The transfer was a setback, but it gave him experience of command, and it meant that he was in a regimental post when the war began in August 1914. His work on the Schlieffen Plan, and his advocacy of a strong right wing, have been much debated by historians, who disagree about whether his version of the plan would have succeeded.

A Brilliant and Difficult Officer

Ludendorff’s reputation in the pre-war army was that of a brilliant but difficult officer. He was respected for his intellect and for his capacity for work, but he was disliked by many of his colleagues for his arrogance, his temper and his unwillingness to listen to other views.

He was a man who believed that he was right and that others were wrong, and he did not hesitate to say so. His transfer from the General Staff in 1913 was the result of his quarrels with his superiors, and it showed the limits of his political skill.

Yet his ability was undeniable, and it was recognised by Hindenburg, who chose him as his chief of staff in 1914, and by the Kaiser, who promoted him rapidly during the war. His character — energetic, determined, impatient and convinced of his own rightness — was both his strength and his weakness, and it shaped his career in war and in peace.

4. Rise to Prominence

Liège and the Opening of the War

When the First World War began in August 1914, Ludendorff was a brigadier general in command of a brigade at Düsseldorf, and he was assigned to the force that attacked the Belgian fortress of Liège. The attack was one of the first operations of the war, and it was a difficult one, because Liège was protected by twelve forts and by a garrison of Belgian troops.

Ludendorff took command of the operation after the death of its commander, and he led the attack with great energy, capturing the city and then reducing the forts one by one with heavy artillery. His conduct at Liège made his name, and it showed his ability to take command in a crisis and to drive an operation forward.

He was awarded the Pour le Mérite, Germany’s highest military honour, and he was promoted to major general. The victory at Liège was the first German success of the war, and it opened the way for the advance through Belgium towards France.

Tannenberg and the Eastern Front

Ludendorff’s rise to fame came in August 1914, when he was sent to East Prussia as chief of staff to Hindenburg, the new commander of the German Eighth Army. The Russian armies had invaded East Prussia, and the German army was in danger of being overwhelmed.

Ludendorff, working with Hindenburg and with the operations officer Max Hoffmann, planned the encirclement of the Russian Second Army at Tannenberg, using the German railway network to move troops rapidly from one part of the front to another. The battle, fought from 26 to 30 August 1914, resulted in the destruction of the Russian Second Army, with some 90,000 prisoners taken, and it saved East Prussia from invasion.

The victory made Hindenburg and Ludendorff national heroes, and it established their partnership as the most famous in the German army. Ludendorff was the brains of the partnership, responsible for the planning and for the detailed direction of operations, while Hindenburg provided the authority and the calm that held the army together.

The Partnership with Hindenburg

The partnership between Hindenburg and Ludendorff was one of the most successful in military history, and it lasted for four years. Hindenburg was a dignified, calm and respected figure, who had been brought out of retirement to command in East Prussia, while Ludendorff was energetic, brilliant and driven, who did the detailed work of planning and of directing operations.

The two men complemented each other, and their partnership was presented to the German public as a model of cooperation. In reality, Ludendorff was the dominant figure, and Hindenburg often deferred to his judgement, but the public image of the two men as a team was important for German morale.

The partnership survived the move from the Eastern Front to the supreme command in 1916, and it lasted until the end of the war, when both men resigned in October 1918. Their partnership is still studied as an example of how a commander and his chief of staff can work together, and of how a public image can be created around a military partnership.

5. Erich Ludendorff’s Role in the War

The Eastern Front, 1914–1916

After Tannenberg, Ludendorff remained as chief of staff on the Eastern Front, where he directed the German campaigns against Russia for the next two years. He planned the Battle of the Masurian Lakes in September 1914, which drove the Russian First Army out of East Prussia, and he directed the offensives of 1915, including the Gorlice–Tarnów breakthrough, in which he worked with Mackensen, and the great advance that took Warsaw and drove the Russians back across Poland.

He was a master of mobile warfare, using the railway to move troops, concentrating his force at the decisive point and exploiting a breakthrough with cavalry and with infantry. His campaigns on the Eastern Front were among the most successful of the war, and they inflicted heavy losses on the Russian army.

He was also responsible for the administration of the occupied territories in the east, where he established a military government that exploited the resources of the region for the German war effort.

First Quartermaster-General and Total War

In August 1916, Hindenburg and Ludendorff were appointed to the supreme command of the German army, with Hindenburg as Chief of the General Staff and Ludendorff as First Quartermaster-General, his deputy and the effective director of operations. In this post, Ludendorff took control not only of military operations but also of the German war economy, of the home front and, increasingly, of German policy.

He introduced the Hindenburg Programme, a massive expansion of the production of munitions and of weapons, and he imposed the Auxiliary Service Law, which conscripted all German men for war work. He intervened in politics, forcing the resignation of Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg in 1917 and dictating the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Russia in 1918.

He was, in effect, the dictator of Germany, and his power was greater than that of the Kaiser or of the Chancellor. His conduct in this period has been much debated: his supporters praise his energy and his organisation, while his critics argue that his demands on the German people were excessive and that his policies contributed to the collapse of the home front.

The Spring Offensives of 1918

Ludendorff’s last great military operation was the series of offensives that he launched in the spring of 1918, after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk had freed German troops from the Eastern Front. The offensives, known as the Kaiserschlacht, began on 21 March 1918 with Operation Michael, an attack on the British Fifth Army on the Somme, and they continued through the spring and summer with attacks in Flanders, on the Aisne and on the Marne.

The offensives achieved great tactical successes, advancing further than any German attack since 1914, but they failed to achieve a strategic breakthrough, and they exhausted the German army. Ludendorff’s tactics, based on the infiltration methods developed by Oskar von Hutier, were innovative, but his strategy was flawed, because he attacked in different places without a clear objective, and he did not concentrate his force on a single decisive point.

By the summer of 1918, the German army was exhausted, and the Allies, under Foch, launched the counter-offensives that ended the war. In September 1918, Ludendorff told the German government that the war was lost and that an armistice must be sought, and he resigned in October 1918.

6. Key Decisions

The Decision to Attack in the West, 1918

The most important decision of Ludendorff’s career was the decision to launch the spring offensives of 1918 in the west, before the American army could arrive in strength. He had to choose where to attack: against the British in Flanders, against the French in Champagne, or against the junction of the two armies on the Somme.

He chose the Somme, because he believed that the British army was the weaker of the two and that a blow against it would separate the British from the French. The decision was based on sound reasoning, and the initial attack was a great tactical success, but Ludendorff then changed his objective, diverting troops to Flanders and to the Aisne, and he never concentrated his force on a single decisive point.

His supporters argue that the offensives came close to success, and that they failed because of the exhaustion of the German army and the arrival of American troops. His critics argue that the offensives were doomed from the start, because Germany lacked the resources to win a war of attrition, and that Ludendorff’s strategy was incoherent.

The debate reflects the wider argument about whether Germany could have won the war in 1918.

The Decision to Seek an Armistice

A second decision, taken in September 1918, was the decision to tell the German government that the war was lost and that an armistice must be sought. Ludendorff had been the most confident of the German leaders, and his admission of defeat came as a shock to the government and to the Kaiser.

He insisted that the armistice be sought immediately, and that the government take responsibility for it, so that the army would not be blamed for the defeat. His critics have argued that his sudden change of mind was irresponsible, and that it created the conditions for the “stab-in-the-back” legend, because it allowed the army to claim that it had been betrayed by the politicians.

His defenders argue that he was right to recognise the truth, and that the German army was indeed defeated, and that an armistice was the only way to save Germany from invasion. The decision was a turning point in German history, and it has been debated ever since.

The Hindenburg Programme and Total War

A third decision, taken in 1916, was the decision to introduce the Hindenburg Programme and the Auxiliary Service Law, which placed the German economy and the German people under military control. Ludendorff believed that the war could only be won by mobilising all the resources of the nation, and he imposed a system of total war that demanded enormous sacrifices from the civilian population.

His supporters praise his energy and his organisation, and they argue that the programme increased the production of munitions and prolonged Germany’s ability to fight. His critics argue that the programme was unrealistic, that it disrupted the economy and that it contributed to the collapse of morale on the home front in 1918.

They also argue that his intervention in politics, including the dismissal of Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, was unconstitutional and that it undermined the German government. The debate about total war is part of the wider argument about Ludendorff’s role as a military dictator.

7. Controversies

The Stab-in-the-Back Legend

The most damaging controversy about Ludendorff concerns his promotion of the “stab-in-the-back” legend, the claim that the German army had not been defeated in the field but had been betrayed by Jews, socialists and republicans at home. Ludendorff himself had told the government in September 1918 that the war was lost, and he knew that the army was defeated, but after the war he claimed that the army had been stabbed in the back by traitors.

The legend was widely believed in Germany, and it was used by the far right to discredit the Weimar Republic and to justify the rise of Hitler. Historians have condemned Ludendorff for promoting a lie that he knew to be false, and they have argued that his conduct was dishonest and irresponsible.

His defenders have argued that he genuinely believed that the home front had failed the army, and that the strikes and the unrest of 1918 had undermined the war effort. The most balanced view is that the German army was defeated in the field, and that the home front collapsed because of the blockade and the exhaustion of the war, and that Ludendorff’s legend was a self-serving attempt to shift the blame for the defeat.

The Kapp Putsch and the Beer Hall Putsch

A second controversy concerns Ludendorff’s part in the far-right politics of the 1920s. In March 1920, he supported the Kapp Putsch, an attempt by right-wing officers to overthrow the Weimar Republic, and he was one of the leaders of the putsch. The putsch failed, but it showed his commitment to the overthrow of the Republic.

In November 1923, he took part in Hitler’s Beer Hall Putsch in Munich, marching alongside Hitler in the attempt to seize power in Bavaria. The putsch also failed, and Ludendorff was tried for treason, but he was acquitted, while Hitler was imprisoned.

His part in these events has been condemned by historians, who argue that he lent his prestige as a war hero to the far right and that he helped to legitimise the Nazi movement. His defenders have argued that he was a monarchist who did not share Hitler’s racial ideology, and that he later broke with Hitler and warned against him.

The truth is that Ludendorff was a leading figure of the far right in the 1920s, and that his support for the putsches did much to damage the Weimar Republic.

Ludendorff and the Nazis

A third controversy concerns Ludendorff’s later relationship with the Nazis. After the Beer Hall Putsch, he broke with Hitler, and he became a critic of the Nazi movement, warning that Hitler was a danger to Germany. He and his second wife, Mathilde, founded a religious movement, the Tannenbergbund, which opposed Christianity and Judaism and promoted a Germanic paganism.

He wrote books attacking the Jews, the Freemasons and the Catholics, and he became increasingly eccentric in his later years. Some historians have argued that his break with Hitler shows that he was not a Nazi, and that his later writings should be seen as the work of a bitter and isolated old man.

Others have argued that his anti-Semitism and his conspiracy theories were part of the same ideology that led to Nazism, and that his criticism of Hitler was a quarrel within the far right rather than a rejection of it. The debate reflects the complexity of Ludendorff’s politics, and it is a reminder that the German far right was divided as well as united.

8. Later Life and Death

Exile and the Far Right

After the war, Ludendorff fled to Sweden, where he lived in exile for a few months, and then returned to Germany, where he settled in Munich. He became a leading figure of the far right, writing books and articles that blamed Germany’s defeat on a conspiracy of Jews, Freemasons and Catholics, and calling for the overthrow of the Weimar Republic.

He was elected to the Reichstag in 1924 as a member of the National Socialist Freedom Movement, and he stood as a candidate for President in 1925, receiving only a small number of votes. He was a controversial and divisive figure, and he was regarded by many Germans as a hero of the war, but by others as a dangerous extremist.

His political career was a failure, and he never achieved the power that he had held during the war, but his writings and his prestige influenced the far right and contributed to the climate in which Hitler rose to power.

The Break with Hitler and Final Years

Ludendorff’s break with Hitler came after the Beer Hall Putsch, when he accused Hitler of betraying the movement and of seeking power for himself. He became a bitter critic of the Nazis, and he warned in his writings that Hitler would lead Germany to disaster.

He and his wife Mathilde founded the Tannenbergbund, a movement that combined Germanic paganism with anti-Semitism and with opposition to Christianity, and he devoted his final years to writing and to promoting his religious ideas. He was increasingly isolated, and he was regarded as an eccentric by many of his former colleagues.

He died on 20 December 1937 in Munich, at the age of seventy-two, and he was given a state funeral by the Nazi regime, which honoured him as a hero of the First World War despite his criticism of Hitler. He was buried at Tutzing, in Bavaria, and his grave is still visited by those interested in German history.

An Isolated Old Man

Ludendorff’s final years were marked by isolation and by bitterness. He had been one of the most powerful men in Germany, and he had commanded armies in some of the greatest battles of the First World War, but he ended his life as a marginal figure, rejected by the Nazis he had once supported and forgotten by the army he had served.

He was a man of great ability who had failed as a politician, and his later writings show a mind that had become obsessed with conspiracy theories. His death in 1937, two years before the outbreak of the Second World War, meant that he did not live to see the consequences of the ideology he had helped to promote.

His life is a cautionary tale about the dangers of military power without political wisdom, and about the way in which a great reputation can be destroyed by political extremism.

9. Legacy

A Great Commander of the Eastern Front

Ludendorff’s military legacy rests on his conduct of the campaigns on the Eastern Front and on his direction of the spring offensives of 1918. He was a master of mobile warfare, of the concentration of force and of the exploitation of a breakthrough, and his victories at Tannenberg, in the Masurian Lakes and in the offensives of 1915 were among the most impressive of the war.

His tactics, based on infiltration and on the use of storm troops, influenced the development of military doctrine in the interwar period, and they were studied by officers in many countries. His partnership with Hindenburg is still cited as an example of cooperation between a commander and his chief of staff, and his energy and his capacity for work are still admired.

His military reputation has survived the controversies about his politics, and he is generally regarded as one of the ablest German generals of the First World War.

The Stab-in-the-Back and the Far Right

Ludendorff’s second legacy is a political one, and it is a damaging one. His promotion of the “stab-in-the-back” legend did much to discredit the Weimar Republic and to create the climate in which Hitler rose to power. His part in the Kapp Putsch and in the Beer Hall Putsch lent his prestige to the far right, and his writings on conspiracy theories contributed to the anti-Semitism that became central to Nazism.

His legacy in this respect is a warning about the dangers of allowing a military reputation to be used for political purposes, and about the responsibility of generals for the political consequences of their actions. Historians have generally concluded that his political legacy outweighs his military achievements, and that he must be judged as a whole, not only as a soldier but also as a political figure.

Ludendorff in German Memory

In German memory, Ludendorff occupies a place that is both honoured and condemned. He is honoured as a great commander of the First World War, and his victories at Tannenberg and on the Eastern Front are still remembered. He is also condemned as a political extremist whose promotion of the “stab-in-the-back” legend and whose support for the far right did much to damage German democracy.

His grave at Tutzing and the memorials to Tannenberg, which were destroyed after the Second World War, are reminders of his complex legacy. Historians in Germany have debated his place in history, and they have generally concluded that he was a man of great military talent and of poor political judgement, and that his life illustrates the dangers of the Prussian military tradition when it is divorced from political responsibility.

Historians in Germany have debated his place in history, and they have generally concluded that he was a man of great military talent and of poor political judgement.

10. Assessment by Historians

The Military Ludendorff

Historians have generally assessed Ludendorff’s military abilities very highly. His planning of Tannenberg, his direction of the Eastern Front campaigns and his conduct of the spring offensives of 1918 are regarded as the work of a commander of the first rank, and his energy, his intellect and his capacity for work are praised by historians of all nationalities.

His tactics, based on infiltration and on the concentration of force, were innovative, and they influenced the development of military doctrine in the twentieth century. The consensus is that he was one of the ablest German generals of the First World War, and that his military reputation is well deserved.

His supporters argue that his offensives in 1918 came close to winning the war, and that they failed because of the exhaustion of the German army and the arrival of American troops, not because of any flaw in his planning.

His supporters argue that his offensives in 1918 came close to winning the war, and that they failed because of the exhaustion of the German army and the arrival of American troops.

The Political Ludendorff

A second strand of assessment concerns Ludendorff’s politics, and here historians are much more critical. They argue that his promotion of the “stab-in-the-back” legend was dishonest, that his part in the Kapp Putsch and the Beer Hall Putsch was irresponsible, and that his anti-Semitic conspiracy theories contributed to the rise of Nazism.

His defenders argue that he was a monarchist who did not share Hitler’s racial ideology, and that he later broke with Hitler and warned against him. They also argue that his political errors were the result of his military training, which had not prepared him for politics, and that he should be judged as a soldier rather than as a politician.

The most balanced view is that Ludendorff was a great soldier and a disastrous politician, and that the two parts of his life cannot be separated, because his military prestige gave weight to his political views. The most balanced view is that Ludendorff was a great soldier and a disastrous politician, and that the two parts of his life cannot be separated.

The Balanced Judgement

The balanced judgement that has emerged in recent scholarship is that Ludendorff was a man of extraordinary military talent and of profound political failure, and that his life illustrates the dangers of allowing a general to become a dictator. As First Quartermaster-General, he took control of Germany’s war effort and of its politics, and he used that power to impose a system of total war that exhausted the country and contributed to its defeat.

After the war, he used his prestige to promote a lie about the causes of the defeat, and he lent his support to the far right, helping to create the conditions for the rise of Hitler. His military achievements deserve to be remembered, and his political errors deserve to be condemned, and the two together make him one of the most important and most controversial figures of the twentieth century.

Historians now generally agree that he must be judged as a whole, and that his legacy is a cautionary tale.

Frequently Asked Questions

Who was Erich Ludendorff?
Erich Ludendorff was a German general who, with Hindenburg, won the Battle of Tannenberg in 1914 and directed the German campaigns on the Eastern Front. He later became First Quartermaster-General and the effective dictator of Germany’s war effort, and after the war he became a leading figure of the far right.

What was Ludendorff’s role at Tannenberg?
As chief of staff to Hindenburg, he planned the encirclement of the Russian Second Army at Tannenberg in August 1914, using the railway to move troops rapidly. The battle destroyed the Russian army and saved East Prussia, and it made Hindenburg and Ludendorff national heroes.

What were the spring offensives of 1918?
They were a series of German offensives launched by Ludendorff in March–July 1918, beginning with Operation Michael on the Somme. They achieved great tactical successes but failed to win the war, and they exhausted the German army, leading to the Allied counter-offensives and the Armistice.

What was the stab-in-the-back legend?
It was the claim, promoted by Ludendorff after the war, that the German army had not been defeated in the field but had been betrayed by Jews, socialists and republicans at home. Historians regard it as false: the German army was defeated in the field in 1918.

What was Ludendorff’s part in the Kapp Putsch and the Beer Hall Putsch?
He supported the Kapp Putsch of 1920, an attempt to overthrow the Weimar Republic, and he took part in Hitler’s Beer Hall Putsch in Munich in November 1923. Both putsches failed, and Ludendorff was acquitted of treason after the Beer Hall Putsch.

How is Ludendorff judged today?
Historians praise his military talent, especially on the Eastern Front, but condemn his political judgement, his promotion of the stab-in-the-back legend and his support for the far right. The balanced view is that he was a great soldier and a disastrous politician.

Related articles

• August von Mackensen
• Ferdinand Foch
• Friedrich Paulus

Sources

• Erich Ludendorff, My War Memories 1914–1918, 1919
• Erich Ludendorff, The Nation at War, 1935
• John Lee, The War Lords: Military Command in the Twentieth Century, 1976
• Holger Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914–1918, 1997
• Martin Kitchen, The Silent Dictatorship: The Politics of the German High Command under Hindenburg and Ludendorff, 1916–1918, 1976
• Hew Strachan, The First World War, volume 1, 2001
• Wikipedia, "Erich Ludendorff"