Casablanca Conference

1. Lead

The Casablanca Conference was the meeting of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill in Casablanca, Morocco, from 14 to 24 January 1943, to plan the next stage of the Second World War. The conference, codenamed Symbol, was the first time the two leaders had met outside Britain or the United States since the war began, and it was held in the aftermath of the Allied landings in North Africa, Operation Torch, and the British victory at El Alamein.

At Casablanca, Roosevelt and Churchill agreed on the policy of unconditional surrender — the demand that Germany, Italy, and Japan surrender without conditions — and on the strategy for 1943: the invasion of Sicily, the bombing of Germany, and the build-up for the invasion of France.

The conference also addressed the question of French leadership in North Africa, bringing together General Charles de Gaulle and General Henri Giraud, the two rival leaders of the French, in a famous but uneasy handshake. The Casablanca Conference is remembered above all for the unconditional surrender policy, which has been debated ever since: whether it prolonged the war by removing any incentive for the Germans to negotiate, or whether it was necessary to assure the Soviet Union and to prevent a separate peace.

This article traces the conference from its origins to its decisions, its participants, and its legacy.

2. Key Facts

Field	Value
Name	Casablanca Conference (codenamed Symbol)
Dates	14–24 January 1943
Place	Anfa Hotel, Casablanca, French Morocco
Participants	President Franklin D. Roosevelt (United States), Prime Minister Winston Churchill (United Kingdom), and their military chiefs
French leaders present	General Charles de Gaulle, General Henri Giraud
Context	After Operation Torch (November 1942) and the Battle of El Alamein (October–November 1942)
Main decision	Policy of unconditional surrender for Germany, Italy, and Japan
Military decisions	Invasion of Sicily (Operation Husky), intensified bombing of Germany, build-up for the invasion of France
Soviet Union	Joseph Stalin invited but did not attend, citing the Battle of Stalingrad
Famous image	Roosevelt and Churchill with de Gaulle and Giraud, the forced handshake
Outcome	Allied strategy for 1943 agreed; no second front in France in 1943
Significance	First wartime conference on Axis soil; defined Allied war aims

3. Origins and Background

North Africa and the Road to Casablanca

The Casablanca Conference was the product of the Allied successes in North Africa in late 1942, which had changed the course of the war. In October and November 1942, the British Eighth Army under General Bernard Montgomery had defeated the German-Italian forces at El Alamein in Egypt, the first major British victory over the Germans, and on 8 November the Allies had landed in Morocco and Algeria in Operation Torch, the first large-scale Anglo-American operation of the war.

The landings, commanded by General Dwight D. Eisenhower, had brought American troops into combat against the Germans for the first time, and they had secured North Africa as a base for further operations. The success in North Africa raised the question of what to do next: whether to invade France in 1943, as the Americans wanted, or to continue the Mediterranean strategy, as the British preferred, by invading Sicily and Italy.

The conference was called to settle that question, and to agree on the policy towards the Axis powers. Roosevelt and Churchill had met before, at Placentia Bay in 1941 and in Washington in 1942, but Casablanca was the first meeting on territory that had been liberated from the Axis, and its location in Morocco was a symbol of the Allied advance.

The conference was held in secret, and the press was not told of its location until it was over.

The Atlantic Charter and the Question of War Aims

The background to Casablanca was the Atlantic Charter, the statement of war aims issued by Roosevelt and Churchill in August 1941, which had promised self-determination, freedom of the seas, and a world without fear or want. The Charter had been a statement of principles, but it had not defined the terms on which the war would end, and by 1943 the Allies needed to agree on whether they would negotiate with the Axis or demand surrender.

The question was complicated by the Soviet Union, which was bearing the main burden of the war on the Eastern Front and which feared that Britain and the United States might make a separate peace with Germany. Stalin, who was invited to Casablanca but did not attend, citing the Battle of Stalingrad, which was reaching its climax, wanted an assurance that the Western Allies would not negotiate, and he wanted a second front in France to relieve the pressure on the Soviet Union.

The question of war aims was therefore not only a matter of principle but of alliance politics, and the unconditional surrender policy was, in part, an answer to Stalin’s concerns. The conference also had to address the question of France: the Free French under de Gaulle and the French in North Africa under Giraud were rivals, and the Allies needed a unified French leadership for the liberation of France.

The origins of the conference thus lie in the military situation, the alliance, and the politics of France, and its decisions would shape the rest of the war.

Operation Torch and the Liberation of North Africa

Operation Torch, the Allied landing in North Africa on 8 November 1942, was the operation that made Casablanca possible, and its history explains the conference’s setting. Torch was the first joint Anglo-American operation, and it involved landings at Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers, carried out by American and British troops under Eisenhower’s command.

The landings were opposed by the Vichy French forces in North Africa, who had been ordered to resist, and there was fighting at Casablanca and Oran before the French commander, Admiral François Darlan, ordered a ceasefire. Darlan, who had been a leading figure in the Vichy regime, became the Allied partner in North Africa, a decision that was controversial in Britain and the United States, where Darlan was regarded as a collaborator.

Darlan was assassinated in Algiers on 24 December 1942, and Giraud succeeded him as the French leader in North Africa. The Torch landings secured North Africa for the Allies, opened the Mediterranean, and provided the base from which the conference could be held.

The landings also raised the question of French leadership, which would be one of the conference’s most difficult issues, and they showed that the Allies would have to work with French leaders whose records were complicated by the history of Vichy.

4. The Main Participants

Roosevelt and Churchill

Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill were the central figures at Casablanca, and their relationship shaped the conference. Roosevelt, the President of the United States, was the leader of the most powerful of the Allies, and his country was providing the bulk of the men and material for the war.

Roosevelt was a confident and optimistic leader, and he believed in the power of American industry and in the need for a clear statement of war aims. Churchill, the British Prime Minister, was the leader of a country that had been at war since 1939 and that had survived the Blitz and the Battle of Britain, and he was a master of rhetoric and of strategy.

Churchill preferred the Mediterranean strategy, arguing that the Allies should attack the soft underbelly of Europe through Sicily and Italy, while Roosevelt’s generals preferred a direct invasion of France. The two leaders had a close personal relationship, built up through their meetings and their correspondence, but they disagreed on strategy, and the conference was the place where those disagreements were resolved.

Roosevelt’s announcement of unconditional surrender, made at the final press conference, was his own initiative, and it surprised Churchill, who supported it but had not expected it to be announced in that form. The Roosevelt-Churchill partnership was the foundation of the Anglo-American alliance, and Casablanca was one of its most important tests.

The Military Chiefs and the Combined Chiefs of Staff

The military decisions at Casablanca were made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the joint Anglo-American body that coordinated the Allied war effort. The American chiefs, led by General George C. Marshall, the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, and Admiral Ernest J.

King, the Chief of Naval Operations, favoured a direct invasion of France in 1943, arguing that it was the shortest route to Germany and that it would relieve the Soviet Union. The British chiefs, led by Field Marshal Alan Brooke, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and Admiral Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord, favoured the Mediterranean strategy, arguing that an invasion of France in 1943 was premature and that the Allies should first secure the Mediterranean and knock Italy out of the war.

The debate between the two groups was the central military issue of the conference, and it was resolved in favour of the British view: the invasion of France would be postponed to 1944, and the Allies would invade Sicily in 1943. The Combined Chiefs of Staff also agreed on the bombing of Germany, the war against the U-boats, and the build-up of American forces in Britain.

The chiefs’ work at Casablanca shows that the conference was not only a meeting of leaders but a working conference, in which the detailed planning of the war was carried out by the men who would command it.

De Gaulle, Giraud and the French Question

The French question was the most politically difficult issue at Casablanca, and it involved two rival leaders: General Charles de Gaulle, the leader of Free France in London, and General Henri Giraud, the commander of the French forces in North Africa. De Gaulle, who had led the Free French since 1940, regarded himself as the embodiment of France and was distrusted by Roosevelt, who saw him as difficult and ambitious.

Giraud, who had escaped from a German prison and had become the French leader in North Africa after Darlan’s assassination, was favoured by the Americans, who saw him as a soldier rather than a politician. Roosevelt and Churchill wanted the two men to work together, and they brought them to Casablanca for a meeting that was intended to produce a unified French leadership.

The meeting was a failure in substance but a success in symbolism: de Gaulle and Giraud shook hands for the photographers, but they did not agree on a joint leadership, and de Gaulle returned to London convinced that the Americans were trying to sideline him.

The French question would not be resolved until later in 1943, when de Gaulle established himself as the leader of the French Committee of National Liberation in Algiers. The Casablanca meeting shows the difficulty of the French question and the limits of what a conference could achieve when the underlying rivalry remained.

5. The Course of Events

The Meetings at the Anfa Hotel

The conference was held at the Anfa Hotel in Casablanca, a resort hotel that had been taken over for the meeting and that was heavily guarded. Roosevelt and Churchill arrived on 14 January, Roosevelt having flown from the United States — the first time a sitting American president had flown and the first time one had left the country during wartime — and Churchill having flown from Britain.

The two leaders and their chiefs met daily for ten days, in sessions that covered the whole range of Allied strategy. The meetings were held in secret, and the hotel was surrounded by troops, while the press was kept away. The conference’s work was divided between the plenary sessions of the leaders and the meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, who worked out the details of the military plans.

The atmosphere was one of confidence: the Allies had won in North Africa, the Germans were being defeated at Stalingrad, and the tide of the war had turned. The conference’s decisions were announced at a press conference on 24 January, at which Roosevelt announced the policy of unconditional surrender and the two leaders posed for photographs with de Gaulle and Giraud.

The Anfa Hotel, which still stands, is a reminder of the conference’s setting, and its gardens, where the leaders walked and talked, are part of the history of the meeting.

The Decisions of the Conference

The decisions taken at Casablanca shaped the Allied strategy for 1943. The most important was the policy of unconditional surrender, announced by Roosevelt at the final press conference, which committed the Allies to accepting nothing less than the complete surrender of Germany, Italy, and Japan.

The military decisions were the invasion of Sicily, codenamed Operation Husky, which would take place in July 1943; the intensification of the bombing of Germany, including the Combined Bomber Offensive; the war against the U-boats in the Atlantic; and the build-up of American forces in Britain for the eventual invasion of France, which was postponed to 1944.

The conference also agreed on the provision of aid to the Soviet Union and on the strategy in the Pacific, where the Americans would continue their island-hopping campaign against Japan. The decisions were a compromise between the American and British views: the Americans accepted the postponement of the invasion of France, and the British accepted the build-up for that invasion and the commitment to unconditional surrender.

The conference’s decisions were not a detailed plan for the rest of the war but a framework within which the Allies would operate in 1943, and they were the basis for the operations that followed, including the invasion of Sicily and the invasion of Italy.

The Announcement of Unconditional Surrender

The announcement of unconditional surrender was the most famous moment of the conference, and it was made almost by accident. At the final press conference on 24 January, Roosevelt, speaking to the assembled journalists, said that the Allies would accept only the unconditional surrender of Germany, Italy, and Japan, and he compared the policy to the surrender of General Ulysses S. Grant at Appomattox, which had been unconditional.

The phrase had not been agreed in advance, and Churchill, who was sitting beside Roosevelt, was surprised, though he supported the policy. Roosevelt later said that the phrase had come to him during the conference, and that he had used it because he believed that the Allies needed a clear statement of their aims.

The announcement was reported around the world, and it became the defining statement of Allied war aims. The policy’s origins have been debated: some historians argue that Roosevelt had planned it, others that it was improvised, and the truth is probably that Roosevelt had the idea in mind and chose the press conference as the moment to announce it.

The announcement shows how a single phrase, spoken at a press conference, can shape the history of a war.

6. Turning Points

Unconditional Surrender and Its Debate

The unconditional surrender policy was the turning point of the Casablanca Conference, and it has been debated ever since. The policy’s supporters argue that it was necessary to assure the Soviet Union that the Western Allies would not make a separate peace, to prevent the Germans from dividing the Allies, and to make clear that the war would end only with the complete defeat of the Axis.

The policy’s critics argue that it prolonged the war by removing any incentive for the Germans to negotiate or to overthrow Hitler, and that it led to greater destruction, including the bombing of German cities and the high casualties of the final year of the war. The debate is unresolved, and historians continue to argue about whether the policy was a mistake or a necessity.

What is clear is that the policy shaped the rest of the war: it meant that there would be no negotiated peace, that the Allies would fight until the Axis surrendered, and that the post-war settlement would be imposed by the victors.

The policy also affected the German resistance to Hitler, which was unable to offer the Allies a negotiated settlement, and it affected the Italian surrender, which was in fact conditional in practice, despite the policy’s name. The unconditional surrender policy is therefore the conference’s most important and most controversial legacy.

Sicily Instead of France

The second turning point was the decision to invade Sicily in 1943 instead of France. The decision was a victory for the British view, which argued that the Allies were not ready for an invasion of France and that the Mediterranean offered a more promising route.

The decision meant that the second front in France, which Stalin had demanded, would be postponed to 1944, and that the Soviet Union would continue to bear the main burden of the war for another year. The decision also meant that the Allies would invade Italy after Sicily, opening a new front in Europe and knocking Italy out of the war.

The invasion of Sicily, which took place in July 1943, was a success, and it led to the fall of Mussolini and the Italian armistice in September 1943. The decision to invade Sicily is therefore a turning point in the strategy of the war, and it shows the influence of the British chiefs and of Churchill’s Mediterranean strategy.

The decision was controversial at the time, and it remains debated: the Americans believed that the Mediterranean strategy was a diversion from the main task of invading France, while the British believed that it was the best use of Allied resources in 1943. The conference’s decision settled the debate for 1943, but the debate would continue until the invasion of Normandy in 1944.

The Postponement of the Second Front

The postponement of the second front in France was the decision that most affected the Soviet Union, and it was the one that Stalin most resented. Stalin had demanded a second front since 1941, and he believed that the Western Allies were deliberately delaying it to let the Soviet Union bleed. The Casablanca decision, which postponed the invasion to 1944, confirmed Stalin’s suspicions, and it strained the alliance.

Roosevelt and Churchill tried to reassure Stalin by promising increased aid and by explaining that the invasion of Sicily would help the Soviet Union by diverting German forces, but Stalin was not convinced. The postponement was a military decision, based on the judgement that the Allies were not ready, but it had political consequences that lasted for the rest of the war and into the Cold War.

The Soviet belief that the West had delayed the second front became part of the Soviet narrative of the war, and it contributed to the mistrust that would divide Europe after 1945. The postponement shows that the decisions at Casablanca were not only military but political, and that they affected the alliance as a whole.

7. Consequences

The Invasion of Sicily and Italy

The immediate consequence of the Casablanca Conference was the invasion of Sicily in July 1943, Operation Husky, which was the largest amphibious operation of the war to that date. The invasion, carried out by American and British forces under Eisenhower’s command, succeeded in capturing the island in five weeks, and it led to the fall of Mussolini on 25 July 1943 and to the Italian armistice in September.

The Allies then invaded Italy, landing at Salerno in September 1943, and the Italian campaign, which lasted until 1945, tied down German forces and opened a new front in Europe. The bombing of Germany, which had been agreed at Casablanca, intensified in 1943, with the Combined Bomber Offensive targeting German cities and industry.

The war against the U-boats, which had also been agreed, reached a turning point in May 1943, when the Allies sank a large number of U-boats and secured the Atlantic supply routes. The consequences of Casablanca were therefore felt across the whole of the war, from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, and the conference’s decisions shaped the operations of 1943 in a way that few other conferences did.

The War Aims and the Post-War Settlement

The longer-term consequence of Casablanca was the definition of Allied war aims, which shaped the post-war settlement. The unconditional surrender policy meant that the war would end with the complete defeat of the Axis and the occupation of Germany and Japan, and that the victors would impose the peace.

The policy’s legacy is visible in the post-war world: the division of Germany, the occupation of Japan, the trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo, and the creation of the United Nations. The policy also affected the way the war is remembered: the demand for unconditional surrender is seen as a statement of moral clarity, a refusal to compromise with evil, and it is contrasted with the negotiated peace of 1918, which was seen as a failure.

The conference’s decisions also shaped the alliance: the agreement on strategy, the provision of aid to the Soviet Union, and the postponement of the second front all affected the relations between the Allies, and they contributed to the tensions that would become the Cold War. The consequences of Casablanca were therefore not only military but political, and they extended beyond the war itself into the post-war world.

The Italian Surrender and the Fall of Mussolini

The fall of Mussolini and the Italian surrender were the most direct consequences of the Casablanca decisions, and they show how the conference’s strategy worked in practice. The invasion of Sicily, agreed at Casablanca, put pressure on the Italian government, and on 25 July 1943 the Fascist Grand Council voted to remove Mussolini, who was arrested by the King.

The new Italian government, led by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, negotiated an armistice with the Allies, which was signed on 3 September and announced on 8 September 1943. The Germans, who had anticipated the Italian surrender, occupied northern Italy and rescued Mussolini, setting up a puppet state, the Italian Social Republic, and the war in Italy continued for another eighteen months.

The Italian surrender was, in practice, conditional — the Allies allowed the Badoglio government to remain and to declare war on Germany — despite the unconditional surrender policy, and it shows that the policy was applied flexibly when it suited the Allies.

The fall of Mussolini was a major Allied victory, and it was the first time that one of the Axis leaders had been removed from power, a sign that the tide of the war had turned.

8. Geography and Context

Casablanca, Morocco and the Mediterranean

The geography of the Casablanca Conference was the geography of the Mediterranean and North Africa, and its location in Casablanca was significant. Casablanca was a port city in French Morocco, on the Atlantic coast, and it had been the scene of the American landings in Operation Torch in November 1942.

The city’s Anfa Hotel, where the conference was held, was a resort hotel in the suburb of Anfa, and its gardens and its position above the sea made it a suitable place for a secret conference. Morocco itself was a French protectorate, and its position at the western end of the Mediterranean, opposite Spain and near the Strait of Gibraltar, made it a strategic location.

The conference’s location showed that the Allies had secured North Africa and that they could meet on liberated territory, and it was a symbol of the Allied advance. The Mediterranean, which had been a contested sea in 1940–42, was now largely under Allied control, and the conference’s decisions on Sicily and Italy were decisions about the Mediterranean strategy.

The geography of the conference is therefore part of its story, and the city of Casablanca, which gave the conference its name, remains associated with the meeting.

North Africa as the Base for the Invasion of Europe

North Africa was the base from which the Allies would invade Europe, and its geography shaped the strategy agreed at Casablanca. The Allied forces in North Africa, having defeated the Germans at El Alamein and landed in Morocco and Algeria, were positioned to invade Sicily and Italy, which were the closest European targets.

The Mediterranean, which the Allies now controlled, provided the sea route for the invasions, and the airfields in North Africa provided the air cover. The decision to invade Sicily was therefore a decision based on geography: Sicily was the nearest and most accessible target, and its capture would open the way to Italy and to the Mediterranean.

The alternative, an invasion of France, would have required a cross-Channel operation from Britain, which was not yet ready, and the Allies’ forces in North Africa would have had to be moved. The geography of North Africa thus favoured the Mediterranean strategy, and the conference’s decisions reflected that geography.

The North African campaign, which ended with the surrender of the German and Italian forces in Tunisia in May 1943, freed the Allied forces for the invasion of Sicily, and the conference’s timing, in January 1943, was chosen to plan the next step before the North African campaign was over.

The Anfa Hotel and Its Setting

The Anfa Hotel, where the conference was held, was a modern resort hotel in the suburb of Anfa, built in the 1930s and known for its gardens and its views of the Atlantic. The hotel was taken over by the Allies for the conference, and its rooms were used for the meetings, while the leaders stayed in villas nearby.

Roosevelt stayed in a villa in the Anfa district, and Churchill stayed nearby, and the two leaders met daily at the hotel. The hotel’s setting, in a quiet suburb away from the city centre, made it easy to guard, and the conference’s secrecy was maintained by the troops who surrounded the area.

The hotel still stands today, and it is a place of historical interest for visitors to Casablanca, though it has been modernised and its role in the conference is marked by a plaque. The Anfa Hotel’s setting is a reminder that conferences are held in particular places, and that the place can shape the atmosphere of the meeting: the gardens, the sea, and the distance from the war gave the leaders a space in which to plan the next stage of the war in relative calm.

9. Outcome and Legacy

The Strategy for 1943 and Beyond

The outcome of the Casablanca Conference was the Allied strategy for 1943, and that strategy was carried out in the months that followed. The invasion of Sicily, the bombing of Germany, the war against the U-boats, and the build-up for the invasion of France were all implemented, and the conference’s decisions provided the framework for the Allied operations of the year.

The conference’s outcome was therefore a practical one: it settled the debate between the American and British views, it agreed on the policy of unconditional surrender, and it gave the Allies a common plan. The conference also had a symbolic outcome: it showed the world that the Allies were united, that their leaders could meet and agree, and that the tide of the war had turned.

The photographs of Roosevelt and Churchill at Casablanca, and of their handshake with de Gaulle and Giraud, were published around the world, and they became images of Allied unity. The conference’s outcome was not a victory in itself, but it was the basis for the victories that followed, and its decisions shaped the course of the war in 1943 and 1944.

The Casablanca Conference in Historical Memory

The Casablanca Conference is remembered as one of the great wartime conferences, along with Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam, and its legacy is the policy of unconditional surrender and the strategy for 1943. Historians regard the conference as a turning point in the war, the moment when the Allies moved from defence to offence and when they agreed on the terms on which the war would end.

The conference is also remembered for its famous images, above all the photograph of Roosevelt and Churchill with de Gaulle and Giraud, and for the phrase unconditional surrender, which has entered the language of war. The conference’s legacy is debated, as described above, and the debate over unconditional surrender continues.

The conference is taught in schools and universities as part of the history of the Second World War, and its documents, including the minutes of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, are studied by historians of the war. The conference’s memory is also preserved in Casablanca itself, where the Anfa Hotel and the city’s history are part of the local heritage, and where the conference is remembered as the moment when the city became part of world history.

Casablanca and the Wartime Conferences

The Casablanca Conference was the first of a series of wartime conferences at which Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin met to plan the war and the peace, and its place in that series is important. Tehran, in November 1943, was the first meeting of the three leaders, and it agreed on the invasion of France in 1944.

Yalta, in February 1945, agreed on the post-war settlement in Europe, and Potsdam, in July 1945, settled the fate of Germany. Casablanca, which was attended only by Roosevelt and Churchill, was the conference that set the pattern: the leaders would meet, the chiefs would plan, and the decisions would be announced to the world.

The conference also showed the limits of the conference system: Stalin’s absence meant that the Soviet Union was not part of the decisions, and the French question showed that not all allies could be brought together. The wartime conferences as a whole shaped the war and the peace, and Casablanca was the first of them to be held on liberated territory, a symbol of the Allied advance and of the confidence that the war would be won.

10. Leaders and Key Figures

Roosevelt, Churchill and Their Partnership

Roosevelt and Churchill were the leaders of the Casablanca Conference, and their partnership was the foundation of the Anglo-American alliance. Roosevelt, who had been President since 1933, was the leader of the United States at the height of its power, and his optimism and his belief in American industry shaped the Allied strategy.

Churchill, who had been Prime Minister since 1940, was the leader of Britain at a time when its empire was under threat, and his rhetoric and his strategic sense shaped the British contribution. The two men had met several times before Casablanca, and their relationship, built on correspondence and on personal meetings, was one of the closest in the history of wartime alliances.

At Casablanca, their partnership was tested by the disagreement over strategy, but it survived, and the conference’s decisions were a compromise that both men could accept. The Roosevelt-Churchill partnership is remembered as one of the great partnerships of the Second World War, and Casablanca was one of its most important moments.

The two leaders would meet again at Quebec, Cairo, Tehran, and Yalta, but Casablanca was the first conference at which they met on liberated soil, and it remains a symbol of their alliance.

Eisenhower, Marshall and Brooke

The military leaders at Casablanca were as important as the political leaders, and their names are part of the conference’s history. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Allied commander in North Africa, was the man who would carry out the conference’s decisions, invading Sicily and Italy and, later, Normandy. General George C.

Marshall, the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, was the architect of the American military effort and the advocate of the invasion of France. Field Marshal Alan Brooke, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, was the advocate of the Mediterranean strategy and the man who persuaded the Americans to postpone the invasion of France. Admiral Ernest J.

King, the Chief of Naval Operations, was responsible for the war in the Pacific and for the war against the U-boats. These men, and their staffs, worked out the details of the conference’s decisions, and their debates shaped the strategy of the war.

The military leaders at Casablanca were professionals who understood the limits of their forces and the importance of logistics, and their work at the conference shows that the war was planned as well as fought. The conference’s military decisions were the product of their expertise, and the operations that followed were the test of their judgement.

De Gaulle and Giraud after Casablanca

De Gaulle and Giraud, the French leaders who met at Casablanca, had very different fates after the conference. De Gaulle, who had been humiliated by the forced handshake, returned to London and then to Algiers, where he established himself as the leader of the French Committee of National Liberation in June 1943, sidelining Giraud and becoming the undisputed leader of Free France.

Giraud, who had been favoured by the Americans, gradually lost influence, and by 1944 he had been removed from his commands. De Gaulle’s triumph after Casablanca shows that the conference’s attempt to create a joint French leadership had failed, and that de Gaulle’s determination and political skill were greater than the Americans had expected.

De Gaulle would go on to lead France to liberation in 1944 and to become the founder of the Fifth Republic in 1958, while Giraud is remembered as a soldier who played a part in the liberation of North Africa but who lacked de Gaulle’s political vision.

The story of de Gaulle and Giraud after Casablanca is a reminder that conferences can bring leaders together for a photograph but cannot resolve the rivalries that divide them.

Frequently Asked Questions

What was the Casablanca Conference?
The Casablanca Conference was the meeting of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill in Casablanca, Morocco, from 14 to 24 January 1943, to plan the Allied strategy for 1943 and to agree on the policy of unconditional surrender.

What was unconditional surrender?
Unconditional surrender was the policy, announced by Roosevelt at Casablanca, that the Allies would accept nothing less than the complete surrender of Germany, Italy, and Japan, without negotiation. It was intended to assure the Soviet Union and to prevent a separate peace.

Why did Stalin not attend Casablanca?
Stalin was invited to Casablanca but did not attend, citing the Battle of Stalingrad, which was reaching its climax in January 1943. He sent his regrets and asked to be informed of the decisions, and he was later briefed on the conference’s outcome.

What military decisions were taken at Casablanca?
The conference agreed on the invasion of Sicily in July 1943, the intensification of the bombing of Germany, the war against the U-boats, and the build-up of American forces in Britain for the invasion of France, which was postponed to 1944.

What happened with de Gaulle and Giraud at Casablanca?
De Gaulle and Giraud, the rival French leaders, were brought to Casablanca to meet and to agree on a joint leadership. They shook hands for the photographers, but they did not agree, and de Gaulle later established himself as the leader of Free France in Algiers.

Why is the Casablanca Conference important?
The conference is important because it defined Allied war aims through unconditional surrender, settled the strategy for 1943, and showed that the Allies were united and on the offensive. Its decisions shaped the invasions of Sicily and Italy and the bombing of Germany.

Related articles

• Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand
• First Moroccan Crisis
• July Crisis

Sources

• Winston Churchill, The Second World War, Volume IV, The Hinge of Fate (1951)
• Franklin D. Roosevelt, public papers and press conference, 24 January 1943
• Combined Chiefs of Staff, minutes of the Casablanca Conference, January 1943
• Arthur Bryant, The Turn of the Tide (1957)
• Warren Kimball, The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman (1991)
• Charles de Gaulle, War Memoirs, Volume II, Unity (1959)