Second Battle of El Alamein

The Second Battle of El Alamein, fought from 23 October to 11 November 1942 in the Western Desert of Egypt, was the turning point of the war in North Africa, and one of the most famous battles of the Second World War.

The British Eighth Army, under Lieutenant General Bernard Montgomery, attacked the German-Italian Panzer Army under Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, at a narrow front between the Mediterranean Sea and the impassable Qattara Depression, about 100 kilometres west of Alexandria. The battle was a set-piece attack, planned in detail by Montgomery and fought with overwhelming artillery, air power and numbers: the British had about 195,000 men, 1,029 tanks and 908 guns, against about 116,000 Axis men, 547 tanks and 552 guns.

The battle lasted twelve days, and it ended with the complete defeat of the Panzer Army, which retreated 1,000 kilometres across Libya, losing about 30,000–38,000 men and most of its tanks and guns. It was, in the words of Winston Churchill, “the end of the beginning”: before El Alamein, the Allies had known only defeat in the desert; after El Alamein, they would not lose another battle in North Africa.

El Alamein is remembered for two reasons. The first is the scale of the victory: it was the first time that a British army had defeated a German army in a set-piece battle, and it was a victory that the British people, who had endured three years of defeat, desperately needed. The second is the controversy: was Montgomery a great general, or was he merely a cautious one who won because he had overwhelming superiority? Did he pursue the retreating Germans too slowly, and did he miss the chance to destroy Rommel’s army altogether? This article sets out what happened at El Alamein, how Montgomery won, and why the battle mattered, both in North Africa and in the wider war.

1. Key Facts

Date	23 October – 11 November 1942
Location	El Alamein, Egypt, about 100 km west of Alexandria
Result	Decisive Allied victory; Panzer Army retreats across Libya
Allied commander	Lt. Gen. Bernard Montgomery (Eighth Army)
Axis commanders	Field Marshal Erwin Rommel (Panzer Army Africa; on leave 23 October–25 October, replaced by Gen. Georg Stumme, killed 24 October); Gen. Ettore Bastico (Italian)
Allied strength	About 195,000 men; 1,029 tanks; 908 guns; about 1,200 aircraft
Axis strength	About 116,000 men (about 50,000 German, 66,000 Italian); 547 tanks; 552 guns; about 600 aircraft
Allied losses	About 13,500 casualties (about 2,350 killed)
Axis losses	Estimated 30,000–38,000 casualties (about 9,000 killed, 15,000 wounded, 13,000+ captured); about 400 tanks lost

2. Background

The war in the desert

The Second Battle of El Alamein was the climax of two years of fighting in the Western Desert, the vast, empty region of Egypt and Libya where the British Eighth Army and the German-Italian Panzer Army had fought a seesaw war since 1940.

The desert war was a war of movement: the two armies advanced and retreated across hundreds of kilometres of sand, fighting battles at Tobruk, at Gazala, at Mersa Matruh, and at El Alamein itself, in July 1942, when the British had stopped Rommel’s advance on Alexandria in the First Battle of El Alamein.

The desert war was also a war of supply: both armies depended on long supply lines, the British from Alexandria and the Axis from Tripoli, 1,500 kilometres away, and the side that could supply its tanks and guns would win.

By October 1942, the British had the advantage: they were close to their base at Alexandria, they were receiving American tanks — the new M4 Sherman — and they had air superiority, while the Axis were at the end of a long and vulnerable supply line, short of fuel, short of tanks, and short of men.

Montgomery takes command

In August 1942, the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, dismissed the commander of the Eighth Army, General Claude Auchinleck, and replaced him with Lieutenant General Bernard Montgomery, a methodical and careful officer who had commanded a division in France in 1940 and a corps in England.

Montgomery’s first task was to stop Rommel, which he did at Alam Halfa, in August–September 1942, when he defeated Rommel’s last attempt to break through to Alexandria. His second task was to prepare for an offensive, and he spent two months doing so: he built up his forces, he trained his men, he stockpiled supplies, and he planned the attack in detail.

He also changed the atmosphere of the Eighth Army: he was a confident and charismatic leader, and he told his men that they would win, and that they would not retreat. The Eighth Army, which had been defeated again and again, began to believe him.

By October 1942, Montgomery was ready, and he launched his attack on 23 October, under a full moon, with the words: “We will hit the Germans for six.”

3. Opposing Forces

The Eighth Army

The British Eighth Army, under Montgomery, consisted of about 195,000 men, organised into two corps: XXX Corps, under Lieutenant General Oliver Leese, which would make the main attack in the north, and XIII Corps, under Lieutenant General Brian Horrocks, which would attack in the south. The army also had the X Corps, under Lieutenant General Herbert Lumsden, an armoured corps that would exploit the breakthrough.

The Eighth Army was a multinational force: it included British, Australian (9th Division), New Zealand (2nd Division), South African (1st Division), Indian (4th Division), and Free French troops, as well as the 51st (Highland) Division and the 7th Armoured Division, the “Desert Rats”.

The army had 1,029 tanks, including about 300 new American M4 Sherman tanks, which were superior to the German Panzer III and Panzer IV, and 908 guns, including the new 6-pounder anti-tank gun. The army also had air superiority: the Desert Air Force, under Air Vice-Marshal Arthur Coningham, had about 1,200 aircraft, against about 600 Axis aircraft, and it dominated the skies over the battlefield.

	Allies	Axis
Infantry	British, Australian, New Zealand, South African, Indian, Free French divisions	German 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions, 90th Light Division; Italian Ariete, Littorio, Trieste, Brescia, Folgore and other divisions
Armour	1,029 tanks, including about 300 M4 Shermans	547 tanks, mostly Panzer III and IV and Italian M13/40
Artillery	908 guns	552 guns
Air support	About 1,200 aircraft (Desert Air Force)	About 600 aircraft
Supply	Short lines from Alexandria; ample fuel and ammunition	Long lines from Tripoli; short of fuel (about 3 days’ supply)

The Panzer Army Africa

The German-Italian Panzer Army Africa, under Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, consisted of about 116,000 men, of whom about 50,000 were German and about 66,000 were Italian. The German forces included the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions, the 90th Light Division, and the 164th Light Division, and the Italian forces included the Ariete and Littorio Armoured Divisions and several infantry divisions, including the Folgore Parachute Division, which was one of the best Italian formations.

The Panzer Army had 547 tanks, mostly Panzer III and Panzer IV, and 552 guns, but it was short of fuel — Rommel had only about three days’ supply — and short of ammunition, and its tanks were inferior to the new Sherman.

Rommel himself was on sick leave in Germany when the battle began, on 23 October, and he did not return until 25 October, after his deputy, General Georg Stumme, had died of a heart attack on 24 October. The Panzer Army was, in every respect, the weaker force, and it was fighting on a front that it could not hold: a narrow front, about 60 kilometres wide, between the sea and the Qattara Depression, where it could not manoeuvre and where it could not retreat without being outflanked.

4. The Battle

Operation Lightfoot, 23–24 October

The battle began at 21:40 on 23 October 1942, under a full moon, with a massive artillery bombardment: 908 guns fired for more than five hours, in the largest British artillery bombardment since the First World War. The bombardment was followed by an infantry attack, Operation Lightfoot, in which XXX Corps attacked in the north, on a narrow front, with the aim of creating two corridors through the German minefields — the “Devil’s Gardens”, as Rommel called them — for the tanks of X Corps to pass through.

The infantry advanced behind a creeping barrage, and they cleared the minefields by hand, under fire, in one of the most dangerous operations of the war. The attack made progress, but it was slow: the minefields were deep, the German resistance was strong, and the corridors were not clear by dawn.

The tanks of X Corps, which were supposed to pass through the corridors and break out into the open desert, were stuck in the minefields, and the battle became a slogging match, a “crumbling” operation, as Montgomery called it, in which the British would wear down the Germans by attrition.

The “crumbling” battle, 25 October – 1 November

For the next week, the battle was a grinding, attritional struggle, in which Montgomery attacked the German positions, sector by sector, with infantry and tanks, supported by artillery and air power, and Rommel counterattacked with his panzer divisions, trying to plug the gaps.

The fighting was fiercest in the north, around the Kidney Ridge and the Rahman Track, where the Australian 9th Division, under Major General Leslie Morshead, attacked the German and Italian positions and drew the German armour onto itself. The Australians suffered heavily — about 2,000 casualties in the first week — but they held, and they forced Rommel to commit his panzer divisions to the north, where they were worn down by British artillery and air attacks.

In the south, the New Zealanders and the South Africans attacked, and they too made progress, though more slowly. Rommel, who had returned from Germany on 25 October, threw his tanks into counterattacks, but each counterattack cost him tanks that he could not replace, and fuel that he did not have.

By 1 November, the Panzer Army was exhausted: it had lost about half its tanks, it was short of fuel and ammunition, and its men were worn out.

The Australian attack and Kidney Ridge

The Australian attack in the north was the key to the battle. The 9th Australian Division, under Major General Leslie Morshead, attacked on 25 October, on a narrow front, with the aim of drawing the German armour north and away from the main British attack. The Australians advanced through the minefields, took the high ground at Kidney Ridge, and held it against German counterattacks for a week.

The fighting at Kidney Ridge was some of the fiercest of the battle: the Australians were attacked by German tanks and infantry, supported by artillery, and they held their ground, at a cost of about 1,000 casualties. The Australian attack succeeded in its aim: it drew the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions north, where they were worn down by British artillery and air power, and it left the German centre weak, where Montgomery would launch his final attack.

Morshead, the Australian commander, was one of the ablest Allied commanders of the war: he had previously defended Tobruk in 1941, and he knew the desert well. His division was made up of volunteers, many of them veterans of the fighting in the Middle East, and they fought with a determination that the Germans, who had faced them before at Tobruk, knew well and respected.

Operation Supercharge, 2 November

Montgomery’s final attack, Operation Supercharge, began at 01:05 on 2 November 1942, with a massive artillery bombardment, followed by an infantry attack by the 51st (Highland) Division and the 2nd New Zealand Division, and then by a tank attack by the 1st Armoured Division. The attack broke through the German lines at the Rahman Track, and the British tanks poured through the gap, into the open desert.

Rommel, who had only about 35 tanks left, could not stop them: he ordered a retreat, and the Panzer Army began its long retreat across Libya. The battle was over, though the pursuit would go on for weeks, and the Panzer Army would not stop retreating until it reached Tunisia, in early 1943.

The Second Battle of El Alamein had lasted twelve days, and it had cost the British about 13,500 casualties and the Axis about 30,000–38,000, but it had changed the course of the war in North Africa for ever.

5. Turning Point

The failure of the minefields

The turning point of the Second Battle of El Alamein was the failure of the German minefields — the “Devil’s Gardens” — to stop the British attack. Rommel had laid more than half a million mines in front of his positions, in a belt up to 8 kilometres deep, and he believed that the minefields would hold the British for long enough for his panzers to counterattack and destroy them.

But the British had prepared for the minefields: they had trained their engineers to clear lanes by hand, under fire, and they had developed new equipment — the Scorpion flail tank, which beat the ground with chains to detonate mines — to clear the way.

The minefields slowed the British, but they did not stop them, and by 2 November the British had cleared enough lanes to pass their tanks through. The failure of the minefields was the moment when the battle turned: once the British tanks were through, the Panzer Army had nothing left to stop them.

Rommel’s shortage of fuel

The second turning point was Rommel’s shortage of fuel. The Panzer Army had only about three days’ supply of fuel when the battle began, and it was dependent on supplies that had to come by sea from Italy, across the Mediterranean, where they were attacked by British submarines and aircraft. By 1 November, the Panzer Army was almost out of fuel, and its tanks could not move.

Rommel’s counterattacks, which had been the key to his success in the desert, were impossible without fuel, and his tanks were forced to fight from fixed positions, where they were destroyed by British artillery and air power. The shortage of fuel was not an accident: it was the result of the British blockade of the Mediterranean, and of the Allied air and naval superiority, which had made it impossible for the Axis to supply their army in North Africa.

The battle was lost, in the end, not on the battlefield, but on the sea, where the British had cut Rommel’s lifeline.

6. Casualties and Losses

The figures

The casualty figures for the Second Battle of El Alamein are generally accepted by historians, because both sides kept careful records. The British lost about 13,500 men, of whom about 2,350 were killed, and about 500 tanks, of which most were recovered and repaired. The Axis lost an estimated 30,000–38,000 men, of whom about 9,000 were killed, about 15,000 were wounded, and about 13,000 or more were taken prisoner, and about 400 tanks, of which most were destroyed or abandoned. The disparity in losses — about 13,500 British casualties against about 30,000–38,000 Axis — was a measure of how complete the victory was, and of how much the British superiority in numbers, in artillery, and in air power had mattered.

	Allies	Axis
Killed	About 2,350	About 9,000
Wounded	About 8,950	About 15,000
Missing / captured	About 2,200	About 13,000+ captured
Total	About 13,500	Estimated 30,000–38,000
Tanks lost	About 500 (most recovered)	About 400 (mostly destroyed)

The figures in the table above are the best available estimates, and they should be read with that in mind: the battle lasted twelve days, the records are incomplete, and the two sides counted their losses differently. What is certain is that the battle was a decisive Allied victory, and that the Axis losses were more than twice the Allied losses, a measure of how complete the victory was and of how much the British superiority in numbers, artillery and air power had mattered.

The Italian divisions

The Italian losses at El Alamein were particularly heavy, and they fell disproportionately on the Italian infantry divisions, which were left behind when the Germans retreated. The Folgore Parachute Division, which had fought bravely at El Alamein, was surrounded and destroyed, and the Ariete Armoured Division was also destroyed.

The Italian soldiers, who had fought well, were abandoned by their German allies, who retreated in trucks while the Italians were left to walk across the desert, and many of them were captured or died of thirst. The fate of the Italian divisions at El Alamein is a reminder that the Axis alliance was not an alliance of equals, and that the Italians paid a heavy price for their alliance with Germany.

The Italian losses at El Alamein — about 20,000 men, of whom about 10,000 were taken prisoner — were a disaster for the Italian Army, and they contributed to the collapse of Italian morale that would lead to the fall of Mussolini in July 1943.

7. Map and Geography

The El Alamein line

El Alamein is a small railway station on the coast of Egypt, about 100 kilometres west of Alexandria, at the point where the Mediterranean Sea meets the Qattara Depression, a vast, impassable salt marsh that lies about 200 metres below sea level and stretches for 300 kilometres to the south.

The front at El Alamein was only about 60 kilometres wide, between the sea in the north and the depression in the south, and it was the narrowest front in the whole desert war. The narrowness of the front was the key to the battle: it meant that Rommel could not outflank the British, as he had done at Gazala, and that the British could concentrate their forces on a narrow front and break through by sheer weight of numbers.

The ground at El Alamein was flat, open desert, broken by low ridges — the Kidney Ridge, the Rahman Track, the Miteirya Ridge — and by minefields, which Rommel had laid in a belt up to 8 kilometres deep. The desert was hot, dry and dusty, and the men who fought there suffered from heat, from thirst, and from the flies and the dust that got into everything.

The Qattara Depression

The Qattara Depression, which anchored the southern end of the El Alamein line, is one of the most inhospitable places on earth: a vast salt marsh, about 300 kilometres long and 100 kilometres wide, lying up to 200 metres below sea level, with no water, no vegetation, and no roads.

The depression was impassable to tanks and to trucks, and it meant that the southern flank of the El Alamein line could not be turned. Rommel, who had built his reputation on outflanking his enemies, was, for the first time in the desert war, forced to fight a frontal battle, on a front that he could not manoeuvre on.

The depression was, in that sense, the British Army’s greatest ally at El Alamein: it took away Rommel’s greatest strength, his mobility, and it forced him to fight the kind of battle — a set-piece, attritional battle — that he was least equipped to win.

The geography of El Alamein explains the battle: it was fought where it was fought because the ground left Rommel no choice, and the British, who had chosen the ground, used it to win.

8. Outcome and Legacy of the Second Battle of El Alamein

The retreat across Libya

The victory at El Alamein was followed by a pursuit across Libya that lasted for months. Rommel retreated 1,000 kilometres, from El Alamein to Tripoli, and then to Tunisia, where he was finally defeated in May 1943, when the Axis forces in North Africa surrendered.

The pursuit was slower than it might have been: Montgomery, who was cautious by nature, advanced methodically, building up his supplies as he went, and Rommel, who was a master of retreat, was able to withdraw his army in good order, fighting rearguard actions all the way.

The slowness of the pursuit has been criticised ever since: Montgomery’s critics argue that he should have pursued more aggressively, and that he missed the chance to destroy Rommel’s army altogether. His defenders reply that the pursuit was as fast as the supply situation allowed, and that Rommel’s army was, in any case, destroyed as a fighting force at El Alamein, and that the rest was a mopping-up operation.

The truth, as with most military controversies, lies somewhere in between.

“The end of the beginning”

The legacy of El Alamein is summed up in Churchill’s words: “Before Alamein we never had a victory. After Alamein we never had a defeat.” The battle was a turning point, not only in North Africa, but in the whole war: it was the first time that a British army had defeated a German army in a set-piece battle, and it gave the British people, and the Allies, the confidence that they could win.

The battle also had a strategic effect: it ended the Axis threat to Egypt and to the Suez Canal, and it opened the way for the Allied invasion of Sicily and Italy in 1943. El Alamein is remembered today in the war cemeteries at El Alamein, where the British, Commonwealth, German and Italian dead are buried, and in the museum at El Alamein, which tells the story of the battle.

The battle is also remembered in the words of Montgomery, who said of his men: “They fought with great gallantry, and they won a great victory.”

The Montgomery controversy

El Alamein made Montgomery a national hero, and it made him one of the most famous generals of the war. But it also started a controversy that has lasted ever since: was Montgomery a great general, or was he merely a cautious one who won because he had overwhelming superiority?

His critics argue that he was slow, that he was unimaginative, and that he won at El Alamein only because he had twice as many men and tanks as Rommel, and because Rommel was short of fuel. His defenders reply that Montgomery’s careful planning, his attention to detail, and his ability to inspire his men were exactly what the Eighth Army needed, and that his victory at El Alamein was a model of how a set-piece battle should be fought.

Most historians now agree that Montgomery was a good general, but not a great one, and that El Alamein was a victory that he deserved, but that it was won, in large part, because he had the resources to win it. The controversy will go on, but the victory itself is not in doubt: at El Alamein, the British Army won, and it won decisively.

9. Commanders

Allied commanders

Lieutenant General Bernard Montgomery (Britain). Commander of the Eighth Army, and the overall Allied commander at El Alamein. Montgomery was a methodical and careful officer, who planned the battle in detail and fought it with overwhelming artillery, air power and numbers. He became a national hero after El Alamein, and he later commanded the Allied forces in Normandy and in the advance into Germany. He was, in the words of one historian, “the most famous British general of the war”.

Lieutenant General Oliver Leese (Britain). Commander of XXX Corps, which made the main attack in the north at El Alamein. Leese was one of Montgomery’s most trusted subordinates, and he later commanded the Eighth Army in Italy.

Major General Leslie Morshead (Australia). Commander of the 9th Australian Division, which attacked in the north and drew the German armour onto itself. Morshead was one of the ablest Allied commanders of the war, and he had previously defended Tobruk in 1941.

Axis commanders

Field Marshal Erwin Rommel (Germany). Commander of the Panzer Army Africa, and the overall Axis commander at El Alamein. Rommel was one of Germany’s most famous generals, and he had won a series of victories in the desert in 1941–42. At El Alamein, he was outnumbered, outgunned, and short of fuel, and he was defeated. He retreated across Libya to Tunisia, and he was later recalled to Germany. He was forced to take his own life in October 1944, after being implicated in the plot to assassinate Hitler.

General Georg Stumme (Germany). Rommel’s deputy, who commanded the Panzer Army for the first two days of the battle, while Rommel was on sick leave in Germany. Stumme died of a heart attack on 24 October 1942, while visiting the front, and Rommel returned to take command the next day.

General Ettore Bastico (Italy). Commander-in-Chief of the Italian forces in North Africa, and the senior Italian officer in the theatre. Bastico commanded the Italian divisions at El Alamein, and he shared Rommel’s command of the Panzer Army, though in practice Rommel made the decisions. Bastico’s forces suffered heavily at El Alamein, and the Italian divisions were, in large part, destroyed in the battle and in the retreat that followed.

Frequently Asked Questions

When was the Second Battle of El Alamein?
From 23 October to 11 November 1942, in the Western Desert of Egypt, about 100 kilometres west of Alexandria.

Who won the Second Battle of El Alamein?
The British Eighth Army, under Montgomery, decisively defeated Rommel’s Panzer Army Africa. The Axis lost an estimated 30,000–38,000 men and about 400 tanks, and retreated 1,000 kilometres across Libya.

Why is El Alamein called “the end of the beginning”?
Because it was, in Churchill’s words, the turning point of the war in North Africa: before El Alamein, the Allies had known only defeat in the desert; after El Alamein, they would not lose another battle in North Africa.

How many tanks did each side have?
The British had about 1,029 tanks, including about 300 new American M4 Shermans. The Axis had about 547 tanks, mostly Panzer III and Panzer IV and Italian M13/40s.

Why did Rommel lose at El Alamein?
He was outnumbered, outgunned, and short of fuel — his army had only about three days’ supply when the battle began — and he was fighting on a narrow front, between the sea and the Qattara Depression, where he could not outflank the British. The British also had air superiority and a secure supply line from Alexandria.

Did Montgomery pursue Rommel too slowly?
Historians still disagree. His critics say he should have pursued more aggressively and destroyed Rommel’s army. His defenders say the pursuit was as fast as the supply situation allowed, and that Rommel’s army was destroyed as a fighting force at El Alamein in any case.

Related articles

• Battle of Anzio
• Arnhem
• Battle of Bataan

Sources

1. Wikipedia, “Second Battle of El Alamein” — dates, strength, casualty figures and commanders.
2. Encyclopædia Britannica, “El Alamein, Battles of” — background and outcome.
3. US Army Center of Military History, The Mediterranean Theater of Operations — the North African campaign.
4. John Keegan, The Second World War (Hutchinson, 1989) — El Alamein and the desert war.
5. Niall Barr, Pendulum of War: The Three Battles of El Alamein (Jonathan Cape, 2004) — the three battles and Montgomery’s command.
6. Stephen Bungay, Alamein (Aurum, 2002) — the battle, Rommel, and the “crumbling” operation.
7. Imperial War Museum, El Alamein collection — photographs, maps and personal accounts.

Further reading

• Correlli Barnett, The Desert Generals (Allen & Unwin, 1960).
• Jonathan Fennell, Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign (Cambridge University Press, 2011).