Bernard Montgomery

1. Lead

Bernard Law Montgomery (1887–1976), known to the world as “Monty”, was the most famous British soldier of the Second World War, and one of the most controversial Allied commanders of the conflict. A meticulous, cautious and supremely self-confident general, he took command of the British Eighth Army in North Africa in August 1942, at a moment when the British had been retreating for a year, and he won the Battle of El Alamein in October–November 1942, the first great land victory the British had won against the Germans.

He went on to command the Allied ground forces in the invasion of Normandy on D-Day, to plan the airborne operation at Arnhem in September 1944, and to accept the surrender of the German forces in north-west Germany in May 1945.

He was, by the end of the war, a field marshal, a viscount, and a national hero — and he was also, in the judgement of many of his fellow generals, the most difficult man in the Allied high command.

Montgomery’s reputation has always been argued over, and the argument is about the same question: was his caution a virtue or a vice? His admirers say that he was the only British general who understood the need to prepare thoroughly, to build up overwhelming strength, and to attack only when victory was certain — and that his method saved British lives and won battles.

His critics say that he was slow, that he missed opportunities, that he exaggerated his own achievements, and that his relations with his American colleagues — above all with Eisenhower and George S. Patton — damaged the Allied cause. Both sides can point to evidence, and this article presents both: the victories and the controversies, the method and the personality, and the record of a general who was, in equal measure, a brilliant commander and a difficult colleague.

2. Key Facts

Full name	Bernard Law Montgomery, 1st Viscount Montgomery of Alamein
Born	17 November 1887, Kennington, London, England
Died	24 March 1976, Alton, Hampshire, England (aged 88)
Nickname	“Monty” / “Monty”
Rank	Field Marshal
Service	British Army, 1908–1958
Main commands	Eighth Army (1942–43); 21st Army Group (1944–45)
Main battles	El Alamein (1942); Normandy (1944); Market Garden (1944); the Rhine (1945)
Famous for	El Alamein; D-Day ground command; Market Garden; the rivalry with Patton
Post-war posts	Chief of the Imperial General Staff (1946–48); Deputy Supreme Commander, NATO (1951–58)
Writings	Memoirs (1958) / Memoirs (1958)

3. Early Life and Education

3.1. A London Childhood

Bernard Montgomery was born on 17 November 1887 at Kennington, in south London, the fourth of nine children of Henry Montgomery, an Anglican clergyman, and Maud Montgomery. His father was, by all accounts, a gentle and scholarly man; his mother was a formidable woman, strict, humourless and domineering, who ruled the household with an iron hand and who, by Montgomery’s own account, made his childhood miserable.

The family moved to Tasmania in 1889, when Henry Montgomery became Bishop of Tasmania, and Bernard spent his childhood in Hobart, in a household that was, in his own words, “a place of fear”. He was educated at St Peter’s College in Adelaide and then, after the family returned to England in 1901, at St Paul’s School in London.

He was not a brilliant student, and he was not a popular boy: he was, by his own account, a lonely and unhappy child, who found comfort in sport — he was a good cricketer and a good footballer — and in the dream of becoming a soldier.

The unhappiness of his childhood left its mark on him: he became, as an adult, a man of extraordinary self-confidence and of equally extraordinary insensitivity to the feelings of others.

3.2. Sandhurst and the Young Officer

Montgomery entered the Royal Military College at Sandhurst in 1907, and he graduated in 1908, commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Royal Warwickshire Regiment. His time at Sandhurst was undistinguished: he was nearly expelled for setting fire to another cadet’s shirt during a rag — an incident that says something about the young Montgomery’s character — and he passed out, in the end, with a mediocre record.

He served in India and then, when the First World War broke out in 1914, he went to France with his battalion. He was, by this time, a young officer of twenty-six, and he was about to learn, in the hardest possible way, what war meant.

His early career gave no sign of the general he would become: he was not a brilliant staff officer, he was not a dashing commander, and he was not, in the eyes of his superiors, a man marked for high command.

What he was, even then, was a man of extraordinary determination, who believed in himself with an intensity that others found either inspiring or infuriating, and who never, for a moment, doubted that he was destined for great things.

3.2.1. The Vicarage at St Mark’s

Montgomery’s childhood home — the vicarage at St Mark’s, Kennington, where he was born — deserves a mention, because it shaped him in ways that his biographers have long debated. The household was ruled by his mother, Maud, a woman of strong evangelical faith who believed in discipline, in duty and in the punishment of sin.

Bernard, who was, by his own account, his mother’s least favourite child, was beaten regularly, and he grew up in an atmosphere of fear and of guilt. He later wrote, in his memoirs, that his childhood had been “a hell”, and that he had learned, from his mother, two lessons that stayed with him for the rest of his life: that life was a struggle, and that the only way to survive it was to be strong.

The lessons were, in a sense, the foundation of his military career: he approached war as a struggle to be won by strength, by preparation and by will, and he had little patience for those who were, in his view, weak. The vicarage at Kennington is, in the end, the place where Montgomery was made, and it is the reason his biographers return to it again and again.

4. The First World War

4.1. The Western Front

Montgomery’s war began in October 1914, at Méteren in northern France, where his battalion was in action against the Germans. On 13 October he was shot through the right lung by a sniper, and he was left for dead on the battlefield. He survived — a passing soldier found him and carried him to safety — and he was awarded the Distinguished Service Order for his conduct.

The wound, which left him with a damaged lung for the rest of his life, was the first of his experiences of war, and it taught him a lesson he never forgot: that war was a matter of life and death, and that the men who fought it deserved a commander who would not waste their lives.

He returned to the front in 1915, and he served as a staff officer for the rest of the war, in France and in Palestine, learning the business of staff work and of planning. He was, by the end of the war, a major with a reputation for thoroughness and for a certain prickliness, and he was determined, as he later wrote, never to send men into battle without preparing properly for it.

4.2. Wounds and Staff Work

Montgomery’s service as a staff officer in the First World War was the foundation of his later career, and it deserves a closer look. He served on the staff of the 47th Division and then of the 17th Division, and he learned, at first hand, how battles were planned, how orders were written, and how the chaos of the battlefield could be reduced, if not eliminated, by careful preparation.

He also learned, from the disasters of the Somme and of Passchendaele, what happened when preparation was inadequate and when men were sent into battle without a clear plan. The lessons stayed with him, and they became the basis of his method in the Second World War: that a battle should be planned in detail, that the troops should be given every advantage, and that the commander should not attack until he was ready.

His staff work was, by all accounts, excellent, and it earned him the respect of his superiors, even if it did not earn him their affection. He was, in the end, a staff officer who became a commander, and his command was, in many ways, the command of a staff officer: careful, methodical and thorough.

4.2.1. Méteren, October 1914

The wound Montgomery received at Méteren on 13 October 1914 was, in many ways, the defining experience of his life, and it deserves to be told in full. He was leading his platoon in an attack on a German position, when a sniper’s bullet struck him in the right lung. He fell, and he lay on the battlefield for hours, bleeding, while the battle went on around him.

He was found, at last, by a soldier of his own battalion, who carried him to a dressing station, and from there he was evacuated to England. The doctors told him that he would never serve again, and that his lung would never fully recover.

He proved them wrong: he returned to the front within a year, and he served for the rest of the war, but he carried the wound with him for the rest of his life, and it affected his health, his stamina and his temper.

The wound also gave him a moral authority that few generals possessed: he had been shot, he had nearly died, and he knew, from his own experience, what it meant to send men into battle. It is the reason his soldiers trusted him, and it is the reason his insistence on preparation was not, in their eyes, cowardice but care.

5. The Interwar Years

5.1. Staff College and the Infantry Manual

Between the wars Montgomery served in a succession of staff appointments, and he became known, within the British Army, as a man of strong opinions about how war should be fought. He attended the Staff College at Camberley, where he was, by his own account, an indifferent student, and he served in Ireland during the Irish War of Independence, an experience that taught him about guerrilla war and about the limits of military force.

In 1937 he was appointed to command the 9th Infantry Brigade, and in 1938 he became the author of the army’s new Infantry Training Manual, a document that set out his views on how infantry should fight: that battles should be planned in detail, that the infantry should be supported by artillery, and that the commander should not attack until he was ready.

The manual was, in many ways, the blueprint for his method in the Second World War, and it was widely read in the British Army. Montgomery was, by this time, a brigadier with a reputation for being difficult, for being outspoken, and for being right more often than his superiors liked.

5.2. The Road to Command

Montgomery’s path to high command was, by the standards of the British Army, a slow one, and it was marked by a series of appointments that, in retrospect, prepared him for the role he would play in the Second World War.

In 1940 he commanded the 3rd Division in France, and he led it in the retreat to Dunkirk, where his division was one of the last to be evacuated, and where his coolness under pressure impressed his superiors. In 1941 he was appointed to command V Corps, and in 1942 he was appointed to command South-Eastern Command, the force that would have defended Britain against a German invasion.

He was, by this time, a lieutenant-general with a reputation for thoroughness and for a certain ruthlessness, and he was, in the eyes of many, the obvious choice to command the Eighth Army in North Africa when its commander, General Auchinleck, was relieved in August 1942.

The appointment was, in fact, an accident: the man originally chosen, Lieutenant-General “Strafer” Gott, was killed when his aircraft was shot down, and Montgomery was chosen in his place. It was the luckiest accident of the war for Britain, and it changed Montgomery’s life.

5.2.1. The Infantry Manual

The Infantry Training Manual that Montgomery wrote in 1938 deserves a closer look, because it was the foundation of his method and the clearest statement of his views on war. The manual argued that the infantry attack should be planned in detail, that it should be supported by artillery fire, that it should be rehearsed before it was carried out, and that it should not be launched until the commander was satisfied that it would succeed.

It was, in the view of its critics, a recipe for caution and for delay; in the view of its author, it was a recipe for victory with the minimum loss of life. The manual was widely read, and it was, in many ways, the most influential document Montgomery ever wrote.

It was also, in the end, the document that defined him: he was a general who believed in preparation, in planning and in the careful husbanding of his men’s lives, and he never, for a moment, departed from the principles it set out.

The manual is still studied today, and it is still, in the view of many military historians, the best statement of the British approach to war in the Second World War.

6. El Alamein

6.1. Taking Command of the Eighth Army

Montgomery arrived in Egypt on 12 August 1942, and he took command of the Eighth Army at a moment of crisis. The British had been driven back across the Western Desert by Erwin Rommel‘s Afrika Korps, and they were now holding a line at El Alamein, a small railway station on the Mediterranean coast, some sixty miles west of Alexandria.

Montgomery’s first act was to order that there would be no further retreat: the Eighth Army would stand at El Alamein, and it would fight there. His second act was to sack the officers he did not trust, and to bring in men he did trust. His third act was to visit the troops, to talk to them, and to tell them that they were going to win.

He wore, on these visits, a black beret with the badge of the Royal Tank Regiment, a beret that became, in the months that followed, the symbol of “Monty” — the general who was, in the eyes of his men, one of them.

The effect on morale was immediate, and it was profound: the Eighth Army, which had been a defeated army, became, in a matter of weeks, an army that believed in itself.

6.2. The Battle of El Alamein

The Battle of El Alamein began on the night of 23 October 1942, with a massive artillery bombardment, and it ended on 4 November, with Rommel’s army in full retreat. Montgomery’s plan was, in essence, a set-piece battle: he would attack on a narrow front, he would break through the German defences, and he would then pursue the enemy across the desert.

The plan was, in the view of its critics, unimaginative and slow; in the view of its author, it was the only plan that would work. The battle was, in the event, a victory, and it was a victory of the kind that Montgomery had always promised: a victory won by preparation, by overwhelming firepower, and by the careful husbanding of men and of material.

The British lost some 13,500 men killed and wounded, and the Germans and Italians lost some 30,000, together with a large part of their equipment. The victory was, in the words of Winston Churchill, “not the end, nor the beginning of the end, but the end of the beginning”, and it was, in the eyes of the British public, the turning point of the war.

6.2.1. The Set-Piece Battle

The set-piece battle that Montgomery fought at El Alamein deserves a closer look, because it was the model for everything he did afterwards, and because it is the reason his critics and his admirers have argued about him ever since. The set-piece battle, in Montgomery’s view, was a battle that was planned in detail, that was rehearsed before it was fought, and that was fought with overwhelming firepower.

It was, in essence, the method of the First World War, applied to the Second: a method that was, in the view of its critics, slow, unimaginative and wasteful of time, but that was, in the view of its author, the only method that guaranteed victory with the minimum loss of life.

At El Alamein the method worked: the British broke through, Rommel retreated, and the victory was, in the eyes of the British public, the turning point of the war. But the method also had its costs: the pursuit was slow, Rommel escaped, and the war in North Africa went on for another six months.

The set-piece battle was, in the end, Montgomery’s greatest strength and his greatest weakness, and it is the reason his reputation has always been argued over.

7. North Africa to Sicily

7.1. The Pursuit and Tunisia

After El Alamein Montgomery pursued Rommel across Libya, in a pursuit that was, in the view of his critics, far too slow. Rommel retreated to Tunisia, where he was joined by German reinforcements, and where the Allies — the British from the east, the Americans from the west — closed in on him.

The campaign in Tunisia ended in May 1943, with the surrender of some 250,000 German and Italian troops, and it was, in the eyes of the Allies, a great victory. Montgomery’s part in it was, in the view of his admirers, a model of careful, methodical warfare; in the view of his critics, it was a missed opportunity, because he had failed to cut off Rommel’s retreat and to destroy his army in Libya.

The argument, like so many arguments about Montgomery, has never been settled, and it probably never will be. What is certain is that the campaign in Tunisia was a victory, and that it cleared the way for the invasion of Sicily, the next step in the Allied advance towards Italy.

7.2. Sicily and Italy

The invasion of Sicily, in July 1943, was the first operation in which Montgomery and George S. Patton served together, and it was the beginning of a rivalry that would last for the rest of the war. Montgomery, commanding the British Eighth Army, landed on the south-east coast of Sicily, and Patton, commanding the American Seventh Army, landed to the west.

Montgomery’s advance was slow, and Patton’s was fast, and Patton reached Palermo and then Messina before Montgomery, to Montgomery’s fury. The rivalry was, in part, a matter of personality: Montgomery was cautious and methodical, Patton was bold and impulsive, and neither man had any patience for the other.

It was also, in part, a matter of national pride: the British and the Americans were, in the eyes of their generals, competing for the glory of the victory. The campaign in Sicily was, in the end, a victory, but it was a victory that left a bitter taste, and it was the beginning of a feud that would poison the Allied high command for the rest of the war.

7.2.1. The Rivalry with Patton

The rivalry between Montgomery and Patton deserves a closer look, because it was, in many ways, the most important personal relationship in the Allied high command, and because it shaped the course of the war in Europe. Montgomery and Patton were, in personality, opposites: Montgomery was cautious, methodical and self-confident; Patton was bold, impulsive and equally self-confident.

They disliked each other on sight, and they never, for a moment, concealed their dislike. Montgomery thought Patton was a reckless amateur; Patton thought Montgomery was a slow, timid pedant. The rivalry was, in the view of many historians, a disaster for the Allies, because it meant that the two armies were competing with each other rather than co-operating, and because it poisoned the relations between the British and the Americans.

But the rivalry was also, in the view of others, a spur to action: each man wanted to outdo the other, and the competition, for all its bitterness, drove both armies forward. The truth, as always, lies somewhere in between, and the rivalry remains, to this day, one of the most argued-over subjects in the history of the Second World War.

8. Normandy

8.1. D-Day and the Ground Command

In 1944 Montgomery was appointed to command the 21st Army Group, the force that would invade Normandy, and he was given, in addition, the command of all the Allied ground forces in the invasion. He planned the invasion in detail, and he was, in the view of many historians, the architect of the Normandy landings.

The landings on D-Day, 6 June 1944, were a success, and the Allies established a beachhead in Normandy. Montgomery’s plan was, in essence, a set-piece battle on a grand scale: the British and Canadians would hold the Germans at Caen, in the east, while the Americans broke out to the west, and the two armies would then encircle the Germans.

The plan was, in the view of its critics, too slow, and it was, in the view of its author, the only plan that would work. The landings were, in the event, a triumph, and they were, in the eyes of the world, the beginning of the end of the war in Europe.

8.2. The Battle for Caen

The battle for Caen, which lasted from June to July 1944, was the most controversial part of Montgomery’s campaign in Normandy, and it deserves a careful account. Montgomery had promised that Caen would be taken on D-Day, and it was not taken until 19 July, after weeks of bitter fighting and after the city had been largely destroyed by bombing.

His critics said that he had failed, that he had been too slow, and that he had wasted the lives of British and Canadian soldiers in a battle that should have been won quickly. His defenders said that he had never intended to take Caen quickly, that his plan was to draw the German armour to Caen, to hold it there, and to allow the Americans to break out in the west — and that the plan had worked.

The argument has never been settled, and it probably never will be. What is certain is that Caen was a bloody and a bitter battle, and that it cost the lives of thousands of British, Canadian and German soldiers, and that it destroyed a city that had stood for a thousand years. The battle for Caen remains, to this day, the most argued-over episode in Montgomery’s career.

8.2.1. The Caen Controversy

The controversy over Caen deserves a closer look, because it is the clearest example of the argument about Montgomery, and because it shows how the same facts can be interpreted in two entirely different ways. Montgomery’s critics point to his promise, made before D-Day, that Caen would be taken on the first day, and to the fact that it was not taken for six weeks, and to the cost in lives and in destruction.

They say that he was too cautious, that he was too slow, and that he missed the opportunity to break out of Normandy quickly. Montgomery’s defenders point to his plan, which was to draw the German armour to the east, to hold it there, and to allow the Americans to break out in the west — and they say that the plan worked, and that the breakout, when it came in late July, was possible only because the Germans had been held at Caen.

Both sides can point to evidence, and both sides are, in a sense, right: Montgomery did promise Caen on D-Day, and he did fail to take it; and his plan did work, and the breakout did happen. The controversy is, in the end, a controversy about what a general should be: a man who keeps his promises, or a man who wins the battle.

Montgomery, as always, believed that he had done both.

9. Market Garden and the Bulge

9.1. A Bridge Too Far

In September 1944 Montgomery proposed Operation Market Garden, an ambitious plan to end the war by Christmas. British and American airborne troops would seize a series of bridges across the rivers of the Netherlands, and British armoured forces would advance along a single road to Arnhem, to cross the Rhine and to enter Germany.

The plan was, in Montgomery’s view, a bold stroke that would outflank the German defences and bring the war to a swift end. In the event, it was a failure: the airborne troops at Arnhem were cut off, the armoured advance was delayed, and the operation ended with the loss of some 17,000 Allied soldiers, most of them British paratroopers.

Montgomery, as always, refused to admit that the plan had failed: he called it, in his memoirs, “ninety per cent successful”, a judgement that has been mocked ever since. The operation was, in the view of most historians, a mistake, and it was a mistake that cost the Allies dearly: it delayed the advance into Germany, it prolonged the war, and it left the Netherlands under German occupation for another eight months.

9.2. The Battle of the Bulge

In December 1944 the Germans launched a surprise offensive in the Ardennes, the Battle of the Bulge, and Montgomery was given command of the Allied forces on the northern flank of the bulge. He handled the battle well: he stabilised the front, he brought up reinforcements, and he helped to contain the German advance.

But his handling of the aftermath was, in the view of many Americans, a disaster: at a press conference on 7 January 1945 he gave the impression that he, and not the Americans, had won the battle, and he infuriated Eisenhower and the American generals. The press conference became, in the eyes of the Americans, the proof that Montgomery was arrogant, ungrateful and incapable of working with his allies.

Eisenhower considered relieving him, and he was dissuaded only by the intervention of the British chiefs of staff. The Battle of the Bulge was, in military terms, a success for Montgomery; in political terms, it was a disaster, and it damaged his reputation in America beyond repair.

9.2.1. The Press Conference

The press conference of 7 January 1945 deserves a closer look, because it was, in many ways, the worst moment of Montgomery’s career, and because it shows, more clearly than any other episode, the flaw in his character. Montgomery had been asked to give a press conference about the Battle of the Bulge, and he used it to explain, in his own words, how he had saved the battle.

He spoke, at length, about his own part in the victory, and he said, in effect, that the Americans had been saved by the British. The American generals, who had fought the battle and who had lost thousands of men in it, were furious, and they said so, in public and in private.

Eisenhower, who had always defended Montgomery, was, for the first time, seriously angry, and he considered, as his diary shows, relieving him of his command. The press conference was, in the end, a self-inflicted wound, and it was a wound that never healed: Montgomery’s reputation in America was, from that day onwards, that of a man who could not be trusted, and who could not be worked with.

10. Later Life and Legacy

10.1. Post-War Commands and Retirement

After the war Montgomery was promoted to field marshal, and he was created Viscount Montgomery of Alamein. He served as Chief of the Imperial General Staff from 1946 to 1948, and as Deputy Supreme Commander of NATO from 1951 to 1958, the first man to hold that post.

He retired in 1958, and he published his memoirs in the same year, a book that was, as always with Montgomery, a mixture of insight and of self-justification. He lived for another eighteen years, at his home in Alton, Hampshire, and he died on 24 March 1976, at the age of eighty-eight.

He was buried, at his own request, in a simple grave in the churchyard at Binsted, near Alton, with a headstone that bore only his name and his dates. The simplicity of the grave was, in the end, characteristic of the man: for all his vanity and all his self-confidence, he was, in his own eyes, a soldier, and a soldier’s grave was enough.

10.2. The Verdict of History

The verdict of history on Montgomery is, and will remain, divided. His admirers say that he was the greatest British general of the Second World War, the man who won El Alamein, who planned D-Day, and who led the British Army to victory in Europe.

His critics say that he was a cautious, unimaginative general who won his battles by weight of numbers and by overwhelming firepower, and who missed the opportunities that a bolder general would have seized. Both sides, as this article has shown, can point to evidence, and both sides are, in a sense, right.

What is certain is that Montgomery was, in the words of one historian, “the most important British soldier of the Second World War”, and that his method — preparation, planning and the careful husbanding of men’s lives — saved the lives of thousands of British soldiers.

It is also certain that his personality — his vanity, his self-confidence and his inability to work with his allies — damaged the Allied cause, and that it is the reason his reputation has always been argued over. Montgomery remains, more than eighty years after El Alamein, a figure who divides opinion, and who will, in all likelihood, divide it for as long as the Second World War is studied.

10.2.1. The Memoirs

Montgomery’s Memoirs, published in 1958, deserve a mention, because they are, in many ways, the most revealing document he ever wrote, and because they are the reason his reputation has been argued over ever since. The memoirs are, in part, a brilliant account of the war, full of insight into the problems of command and into the personalities of the men Montgomery served with.

They are also, in part, a work of self-justification, in which Montgomery presents himself as the only general who understood the war, and in which he criticises, often harshly, the generals who served with him — above all Eisenhower, who was, in Montgomery’s view, a politician rather than a soldier.

The memoirs were, in the view of many readers, a mistake, because they damaged Montgomery’s reputation and because they poisoned his relations with his former colleagues. But they were also, in the view of others, a work of honesty, in which a general who had always spoken his mind continued to do so.

The memoirs remain, to this day, one of the most read and most argued-over books about the Second World War.

11. Frequently Asked Questions

Who was Bernard Montgomery?
A British field marshal, born in 1887, who commanded the Eighth Army at El Alamein in 1942 and the 21st Army Group in Normandy in 1944. He was the most famous British soldier of the Second World War, and one of its most controversial generals.

What was Montgomery’s greatest victory?
The Battle of El Alamein, in October–November 1942, where his Eighth Army defeated Rommel’s Afrika Korps. It was the first great land victory the British had won against the Germans, and Churchill called it “the end of the beginning”.

Why is Montgomery controversial?
Because he was cautious and slow, because he exaggerated his own achievements, and because his relations with his American colleagues — above all Eisenhower and Patton — were poor. His admirers say his caution saved lives; his critics say it missed opportunities, above all at Caen and at Arnhem.

What was Operation Market Garden?
Montgomery’s plan, in September 1944, to seize a series of bridges in the Netherlands by airborne troops and to cross the Rhine at Arnhem. It failed, with the loss of some 17,000 Allied soldiers, and Montgomery’s claim that it was “ninety per cent successful” has been mocked ever since.

What did Montgomery do after the war?
He was promoted to field marshal and created Viscount Montgomery of Alamein. He served as Chief of the Imperial General Staff (1946–48) and as Deputy Supreme Commander of NATO (1951–58), and he published his memoirs in 1958. He died in 1976, at the age of eighty-eight.

What was Montgomery’s nickname?
“Monty”. The name came from his habit of visiting the troops, wearing a black beret with the badge of the Royal Tank Regiment, and talking to them about the battle to come. His soldiers loved him, and the name stuck.

12. Sources

1. Wikipedia, “Bernard Montgomery” — dates, commands, battles and post-war career.
2. Encyclopædia Britannica, “Bernard Law Montgomery, 1st Viscount Montgomery” — life and assessment.
3. Bernard Montgomery, Memoirs (Collins, 1958) — his own account, to be read with care, since it is self-justifying.
4. Nigel Hamilton, Monty: The Making of a General, 1887–1942 (Hamish Hamilton, 1981) — the standard biography, first volume.
5. Nigel Hamilton, Monty: Master of the Battlefield, 1942–1944 (Hamish Hamilton, 1983) — the standard biography, second volume.
6. Stephen Brooks (ed.), Montgomery and the Eighth Army (Bodleian Library, 2008) — the North African campaign.
7. Carlo D’Este, Decision in Normandy (Collins, 1983) — the Normandy campaign and the Caen controversy.

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